Reinaldo Iturriza is a Venezuelan sociologist, writer and political activist. In this interview conducted by Santiago Mayor, and originally published in Spanish at Diario Red, Iturriza looks at the situation after the United States’ January 3 attack on Venezuela and the state of Chavismo.
Below is an abridged and edited version of the English translation done by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, which Green Left is publishing in two parts.
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What happened on January 3 was unprecedented and disconcerting because it was not a coup d’état in the traditional sense, which involves a change in government. How do you view what happened that day?
It was an invasion, plain and simple. A flagrant and criminal violation of our sovereignty, preceded by constant threats and provocations, as well as the murder of dozens of fisherfolk in the Caribbean Sea.
More than 100 Venezuelan and Cuban internationalist military personnel in charge of protecting the president died in combat that morning.
Regarding a change in government, this exposes the false claim that US aggression was motivated by democracy, just as the preceding siege had nothing to do with drug trafficking.
Clearly, the US government wanted to regain control of our strategic resources, starting with oil. Weighing up its options and considering possible scenarios, it concluded that the least traumatic way to achieve this objective was by preserving the existing government.
How did we get to this situation?
Only someone with no political knowledge would dare state something like “we should thank the US for taking the first steps to free us from a tyranny that had been in power for 25 years, and which otherwise could have prevailed indefinitely”.
I say this because Venezuelan society is not exactly known for being depoliticised. This is not just a self-serving version of events, but a very dangerous one, that seeks to defend the indefensible. That is why it has to be debunked.
Throughout the first decade of this century, and even the first half of the previous decade, Venezuela was characterised by a high-intensity democracy in which the majority experienced remarkable progress in all aspects of their material and spiritual lives.
But we also need to understand what happened here during the past 10 years and the circumstances that led to the loss of our high-intensity democracy.
What we suffered was nothing more than what [Italian Marxist Antonio] Gramsci called the “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces”, during which we saw democratic life deteriorate and the progressive weakening of the political class and its respective social bases.
This was the context in which, using Gramscian terminology, the “foreign sentinel” intervened on January 3. This foreign sentinel, it should be noted, played a leading role in the conflict by decisively supporting [the right-wing opposition] while working to undermine the national economy’s foundations [through the use of sanctions and other means].
The Delcy Rodríguez government has largely accepted the US’ conditions. Is this a ‘betrayal’ or a temporary retreat?
Talking in terms of betrayal or loyalty to the cause contributes nothing to understanding the situation. Overusing historical analogies also does not help.
The government sought a rapprochement with certain factions of the capitalist class throughout 2016, and then implemented an orthodox monetarist program in 2018, which fundamentally sought to control hyperinflation but, among other things, meant unprecedented public spending cuts and wage freezes.
Some colleagues at the time asked me whether this was similar to [Russian revolutionary Vladimir] Lenin’s New Economic Policy or, on the contrary, whether it represented the abandonment of the Bolivarian Revolution’s strategic programmatic banners.
I responded that we needed an analysis of power relations and that, regardless of how it was described, the incontrovertible fact was that a recomposition of the ruling bloc was taking place.
The working class, slowly but surely, was ceasing to be the backbone of that ruling bloc, as it undoubtedly was during the entire [Hugo] Chávez period and even during the first years of [Nicolás Maduro.
After January 3, the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk [signed by Soviet Russia with the Central Powers] was invoked to explain the peace agreement with the US government, in much the same way that [Russian dictator Joseph] Stalin was previously invoked because he defeated fascism and we were having to confront the far right.
Paradoxically, during the past 10 years, we have been in similar situations to that faced by the Soviet Union in 1921, 1945 and 1918, yet today, after retreat after retreat, the Bolivarian process is not in a better position to confront the future.
In retrospect, the facts point to a structural retreat or, more precisely, a full-blown strategic retreat.
A few days after January 3, you wrote that the popular reaction was one of ‘silence’ and ‘mourning for a humiliated homeland’. You also made an interesting point that ‘far from signifying consent with what had happened’, this reflected a discontent that found ‘no outlet for expression’. Is there a vacuum of political representation?
Contrary to the usual narratives, Venezuelan society has become increasingly depolarised over the past 10 years or, better said, that polarisation has taken on new contours: the majority versus its political class.
During this period, no political phenomenon has been more significant, or had more far-reaching implications, than that of political disaffiliation.
This is not a recent “discovery”; I first raised this in December 2015, in relation to the parliamentary election results. Analysed in depth, it was clear that the United Socialist Party of Venezuela defeat was due to an anti-government protest vote in Chavista electoral strongholds.
Significantly, despite historical differences and significant contextual variations, we did not see people celebrating in the streets after that defeat, just like we did not see this on January 3. That protest vote was a demand for the government to change course.
From the perspective of a significant portion of Chavismo, this course correction did not occur. On the contrary, it was precisely from that point on that the recomposition of the ruling bloc intensified.
Why did this political disaffiliation occur?
My working hypothesis is that mass disaffiliation from Chavismo, understood as a political identity, is directly proportional to the distancing of the governing political class from its working-class origins.
In other words, to the extent that this political identity ceased to embody the interests of the popular majorities, these majorities ceased to feel represented by it.
This should not be confused with depoliticisation. Rather, the main driving ideas that shaped and gave meaning to how the popular majorities conceive of politics ceased to be associated with a specific identity.
This is very prevalent among youth, where there is depoliticisation. But it is not uncommon to strike up a conversation with someone in their 20s from a working-class background and realise that several of the core ideas that historically defined Chavismo are still there; they just lack political expression today.
This phenomenon is far from exclusive to youth. It describes the situation of the vast majority of Venezuelan society. This majority does not accept things like an invasion, but finds no way to express its profound discontent with the state of affairs.
Donald Trump’s offensive in Latin America, in a global context of military escalation and the rise of the far right, presents a complex scenario for the left. How do you see the future of Chavismo in this context?
The onslaught of the far right on a global scale cannot be countered with wishful thinking or naïve pragmatism. There is no more effective incentive than this to develop the capacity to conduct the most rigorous and unflinching analyses possible of the balance of power.
In moments of retreat, the priority must be preparing a counteroffensive. This is impossible if we start from self-satisfied analyses or simply seeking to reaffirm our victimhood.
In the battle of ideas, it is crucial to create an effective narrative about the Bolivarian Revolution. One that does not shy away from pointing out our errors or limits but gives due credit to our many successes, starting with the fact that we managed to outline a programmatic vision that was embraced by the popular majorities, who for the first time in a long time felt in control of their destiny.
We also need to account for the multiple and diverse causes that led to the interruption of this program.
The above will have to be done amid a profound crisis of political representation. We have to be prepared for and even encourage the emergence of a new political identity that does not deny its national, popular and anti-capitalist character.
In the short term, what is essential is the convergence of all forces, regardless of their political leanings, to oppose the imposition of guardianship upon our nation. We are on the verge of new battles to recover our full sovereignty.