While there have been sporadic clashes between Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan for more than two years, tensions escalated from October 9–12.
Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, and a town in Kunar province was attacked on October 9, claiming several lives. Islamabad neither claimed responsibility nor denied it. However, the Taliban regime retaliated.
There were two motivations for the Taliban’s actions: First, Pakistan is almost universally unpopular in Afghanistan and the Taliban viewed a “war” with it as an opportunity to gain some social acceptability. This was evident from the rhetoric. Instead of declaring skirmishes as jihad (Holy War), the Taliban propaganda czars deployed patriotic themes.
Second, the Taliban could not afford to appear vulnerable in the eyes of Afghans, because it is a regime that rules through violence and terror, lacking any hegemonic legitimacy.
What about Pakistan? Its military is the alpha and omega of domestic and international decision-making. In the period following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, it gambled with a mad intent and appeared to side with Washington against the Taliban and al-Qaida, while simultaneously providing safe havens to Taliban and al-Qaida operatives.
Notably, al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden was hunted down by the US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, a town in northwestern Pakistan.
Loyal outpost
Since 1947, when Pakistan emerged as a severed part of British India, it has played the role of a mischievously loyal US outpost in the region. For domestic consumption, the suicidal policy to provide safe havens to the Taliban from 2001 onwards, with bloody ramifications, was justified in the name of “strategic depth”. It was argued that Pakistan, to counter India, requires Afghanistan as a secure backyard.
In the post-9/11 dynamics, India apparently got a strong foothold in Afghanistan, owing to the US occupation.
The policy of “running with the Taliban/al-Qaida hare” and “hunting with the US hound” annoyed the pro-Taliban and al-Qaida-allied outfits in Pakistan.
These outfits, in turn, were nurtured by the Pakistani state in the 1980s. Initially, these militant groups, with Islamic fundamentalist outlooks, were raised to assist the Afghan Mujahideen in their jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
In the 1990s, such battalions were deployed in a proxy war against Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
A wave of terrorism swept Pakistan between 2003 and 2021, costing about 70,000 lives. During the same period, instead of reviewing its policy of nurturing Frankenstein’s monsters, yet another monster was created to assist the Afghan Taliban: Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (Movement of Taliban in Pakistan, TTP).
When, in August 2021, US forces exited Afghanistan Vietnam-style, and the Taliban captured Kabul for a second time, Islamabad publicly celebrated the Taliban victory. Then-Prime Minister Imran Khan — presently serving an “indefinite” prison term — tweeted that the Taliban had broken “the shackles of slavery”. Pakistan’s top spymaster General Faiz Hamid arrived in Kabul and triumphantly appeared before the global media at Hotel Serena.
Owing to widespread anti-Americanism in the country and state-sponsored propaganda, a majority in Pakistan also viewed the Taliban takeover approvingly. According to mainstream opinion-makers, through the Taliban’s victory, Pakistan had not merely humbled the world’s mightiest power, its arch-rival India was also forced to bite the dust. For a while, there was a V-Day atmosphere in mainstream Pakistan.
However, the strategic-depth grapes soon turned sour. Islamabad wanted Kabul to rein in the TTP. The TTP, however, galvanised by the US defeat, wanted to expand the Taliban-style puritan system to Pakistan itself. Hence, a renewed wave of terror attacks along Afghanistan-Pakistan border unnerved Pakistani authorities. When countered, the TTP rank and file took refuge in Afghanistan.
Apparently and officially, Pakistan describes the TTP safe havens in Afghanistan, provided by Kabul, as the justification for the present row.
Pakistan’s claim cannot be dismissed easily. The previous year proved most deadly in a decade for Pakistan: 2500 people, including 400 soldiers, were killed. The present year may prove even more deadly as figures become available. In most cases, the TTP was involved (a parallel “insurgency” is going on in Balochistan province).
US-China rivalry to blame?
However, some critics refer to the US-China rivalry in the region and beyond as the actual explanation behind Pakistan’s attack on Afghanistan.
The proof, critics offer, is US President Donald Trump’s statement during a trip to Britain. In a joint press conference with British PM Keir Starmer on September 18, Trump said of Soviet-built Bagram airbase in Afghanistan: “It’s one of the biggest airbases in the world, we gave it to them [Taliban] for nothing … one of the reasons we want the base … is it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.”
Another explanation echoing in Pakistani media is Islamabad’s bid to bring on regime change in Kabul. Factional fights, no doubt, have afflicted the Taliban. It is not as monolithic as it was in the 1990s. The Taliban’s Haqqani network is seen as Islamabad’s proxy, while the Kandahar-based faction, apparently the successor to “Founding Father” Mullah Omar, is rather rebellious.
The rationale behind presumptive regime change, analysts argue, is to install Haqqanis at the helm in order to stifle the TTP and retain Afghanistan as a site of Pakistan’s strategic depth.
Days before Trump’s comments, Afghan foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi flew to New Delhi to discuss diplomatic, trade and economic ties, to the embarrassment of, and in defiance of, Islamabad.
His visit to India was seen as Frankenstein’s monster coming full circle even perhaps by the Pakistani state.
Intimidation tactics?
In the absence of any concluding evidence, it is hard to say which of the above priorities factored into Islamabad’s push against Kabul.
It is possible that all played some role. Pakistan, no doubt, would like to rein in the TTP and would go to any length to dissuade Kabul from allying with New Delhi, including via regime change.
A regime change, however, may be a far-fetched idea. It is most likely that the regime change narrative has been deployed to unsettle the Taliban in order to force them onto the back foot.
Likewise, Pakistan cannot annoy China, beyond a certain threshold to appease the US, as it depends on China for military support and its financial dependency is even bigger.
China has become Pakistan’s largest lender in the past two decades. Of Pakistan’s $160 billion external debt, more than $30 billion is owed to China. Likewise, China is the source of the key foreign direct investments.
Since the Pakistani ruling class is notorious for running with the hare and hunting with the hound, it is possible that an attack on Kabul was sold to the White House as an effort to secure Bagram airbase while keeping Beijing in the loop. However, its actual purpose was to intimidate the Taliban so that it toes Islamabad’s line.
Pakistan has a superior military power to assert. However, it also has a few other levers it can use to screw up the Taliban regime.
For instance, Afghanistan is a landlocked country and depends on Pakistan for crucial imports, including food and medicine. Pakistan has repeatedly shut the trade routes to choke Afghanistan over the past two years. Pakistan also deported nearly a million Afghan refugees back to their homeland.
The Taliban are also concerned over Pakistan’s patronising of Islamic State (Daesh/ISIS). When foreign minister Amir Khan landed in New Delhi, Daesh mocked the Taliban for embracing “the Hindus who kill Indian Muslims” — a reference to the anti-Muslim politics of PM Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (People’s Party).
The Taliban also approached China and Saudi Arabia for talks, besides visiting India.
Mediated by Turkey, Qatar was quick to host peace talks between the Taliban and Pakistan in Doha. A ceasefire was hurriedly announced. A second round of negotiations, hosted by Turkey in Istanbul, was concluded on October 30. Qatar’s benign presence signalled US approval. The third round of peace talks began on November 6 and ended without agreement. The tenuous ceasefire on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border remains in place — as do the contradictions.
Frankensteins cannot live in peace while their monsters rule the roost in their vicinity. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region, tragically, will continue bleeding for the foreseeable future. Innocent civilians, especially women, will pay the price.