PALESTINE: A road map to apartheid

May 7, 2003
Issue 

BY AHMED NIMER

RAMALLAH — Before the US-led invasion of Iraq, the US and British governments made it clear that they were planning for an immediate resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and a rapid implementation of the US "road map" to "peace" following the end of the war. They presented this call as evidence of their commitment to the ultimate goal of an end to violence in the region. In reality, the road map is a blueprint for an apartheid state through the cantonisation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Many on the left and in the solidarity movement misunderstand the dynamic of what is occurring in occupied Palestine. The political program of Israel's right-wing — "transfer" (expulsion) of the Palestinians — is seen as an imminent threat to the population in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. In reality, it is the program of "negotiated settlement" or "peace" which is the most likely course over the next period.

This has always been the political objective sought by Israeli, European and US capital and presents the greatest danger to any hopes of Palestinian national self-determination. Its objective is an end to the Palestinian people's resistance to the Israeli occupation and division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into isolated enclaves separated by Israeli settlements and military checkpoints. This checkerboard of land islands will be called a Palestinian state but it will be a state in name only.

In reality, Israel will continue to control the Palestinians' land, economy and natural resources. This future Palestinian state will be ruled by a Palestinian Authority completely reliant upon foreign capital for its continued existence.

Over the past few months, many pro-Palestinian activists expressed fears that the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would carry out large-scale expulsions and massacres of the Palestinian population while the attention of the world was diverted by events in Iraq. In reality, the war period has been marked by a continuation of Israel's strategy of crushing the Palestinian political movement on the ground, particularly those factions with strong popular roots, while cultivating a Palestinian leadership that will return to negotiations with Tel Aviv.

Crushing the 'street'

In the last two years, more than 200 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli assassinations; 120 of whom were not the targets of the attacks, including 27 children. In addition, thousands of Palestinians have been killed or injured at demonstrations or during Israeli military incursions into Palestinian towns and villages.

Most assassinations have been aimed at local military leaders of the key opposition parties such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Also targeted have been some militants of the ruling Palestinian organisation, Fatah, who have followed an independent line and have been willing to organise outside of the official structures of their party.

The aim of this policy is to weaken the capacity of these organisations to carry out military operations against the occupying Israeli army and its armed settlers, or resist the frequent military incursions into Palestinian areas.

The Israeli army is carrying out a massive campaign of repression. There are around 8000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel's prisons and detention centres, a level not experienced in more than a decade. More than 1000 of these prisoners are held under administrative detention orders: they have not been charged with a crime or faced trial, but are kept in prison for up to six months. Local prisoner support organisations estimate that around 40% of Palestinian males have spent time in an Israeli prison at some point in their lives.

Israel has also implemented a draconian system of restricting the Palestinian people's movement through closures, curfews and military checkpoints. The West Bank now consists of 64 separate enclaves, with movement between them regulated by a system of military-issued permits and army checkpoints. To travel between areas requires a permit from the local District Coordinating Office, under the control of the Israeli military. It is very difficult to obtain a permit if you have been politically active or have been previously arrested. Permits can be cancelled on a whim and, even with a permit, there is no guarantee that movement between areas will be permitted.

The enclaves are also separated by large Israeli settlement blocs and Israeli-only roads built on expropriated Palestinian land. These settlement blocs resemble giant fingers protruding into the West Bank and dividing the north, centre and south into three cantons.

Israel is constructing what has been dubbed the "apartheid wall". This 9-metre-high concrete barrier will stretch 360kms along the length of the West Bank. The wall hugs the edges of Palestinian towns — literally imprisoning the residents (see map). There are plans for another wall that will be built along the eastern side of Palestinian towns, meaning that all Palestinian areas in the West Bank will be surrounded by a concrete barrier interspersed with guard towers. According to Palestinian environmental and human rights groups, around 10% of the West Bank's land will be confiscated for the first stage of the wall. The northern West Bank town of Qalqilya has been completely surrounded by the wall; there is only one entrance to the city, guarded by Israeli soldiers.

Leadership crisis

Following on from earlier plans proposed by CIA head George Tenet and the 2001 "Mitchell Plan", the yet-to-be unveiled "road map" calls for a withdrawal of Israeli troops to positions held prior to the September 2000 intifada and a resumption of political negotiations in stages under the supervision of the US and the European Union.

According to the April 29 Israeli Haaratz newspaper, the three-stage plan envisions full Palestinian statehood within three years and a provisional state with temporary borders as early as this year. The "Quartet" of international mediators — the US, the EU, the United Nations and Russia — would monitor Israel's and the Palestinians' compliance with the "road map". Washington would be the arbiter over whether the plan's two most important issues were being addressed: the Palestinians' halt to attacks on Israeli forces and a freeze on Israeli settlements.

At each stage, the Palestinian National Authority (PA) would be required to take responsibility for Israel's security as Israeli troops withdraw.

This process aims to restore the influence of a tame-cat PA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while ultimate control is retained by the Israeli government. The end product of this process will be a "Palestinian state", but it will be a state in name, not in substance. Movement between different areas will continue to be regulated by Israeli permits and checkpoints, and circumscribed by massive concrete walls and Israeli settlements.

Key to the implementation of the "road map" is a PA willing to forego the basic rights and demands of the Palestinian people, and prepared to resume the role of controlling the Palestinian "street" through the arrest of activists and the demobilisation of opposition Palestinian factions. Over the last few months, Washington has been working assiduously to achieve this goal by promoting an alternative Palestinian leadership, with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as its prime minister.

During April, this provoked the most serious leadership crisis in 20 years within Fatah, between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Abu Mazen. Abu Mazen was a founding member of Fatah and one of its major financial backers in the late 1960s. Since 1983, he has been one of the central proponents of "normalisation" of relations with the Israeli government.

A document Abu Mazen drafted in the early 1990s, with Israeli academic and Knesset (parliament) member Yossi Beilin, relinquishes many key Palestinian demands such as the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their lands and homes from which they were expelled in 1948. He has also been highly critical of the current intifada, particularly armed resistance to Israel's aggression. Abu Mazen's nomination for the post of Palestinian prime minister was strongly supported by Israel, the US and the EU.

The dispute between Arafat and Abu Mazen is a reflection of the political crisis that the Palestinian movement faces. The US and Israel have made it very clear that they want Abu Mazen to be solely in charge of a new Palestinian government. They have repeatedly stated that once Abu Mazen appoints a new government they will move quickly to implement the "road map".

However, Abu Mazen has no popular support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A recent poll gave him only 3% support compared to more than 30% for Arafat. Perhaps more significantly, Abu Mazen has no base within Fatah, despite his high position in the organisation. His political role in Fatah has stemmed from his relationship with Arafat.

Fatah

Fatah does not resemble a typical political party with a defined program and tendencies. Instead, it is composed of a series of "pyramids", each led by a leader, which in turn forms a pyramid with Arafat at the apex. Political power is won largely through financial patronage distributed to the lower ranks of each pyramid, with Arafat as the central distributor of funds. This method of rule has allowed Arafat to keep the structure together despite the existence of vastly different political tendencies within the movement.

Arafat has purposely allowed contradictory factions and individuals to co-exist, each speaking with a different voice and delivering a different message. During the 1980s, for example, he would strongly promote armed resistance while secretly allowing people such as Abu Mazen to engage in negotiations with Israeli representatives. Keeping power centralised in his hands, Arafat dispensed funds and/or political positions while ruthlessly dealing with any individual or group that began to exert too much independence.

Until recently, this system functioned relatively smoothly. However, during the current intifada, Fatah has been pulled almost to breaking point by the pressure of popular opposition to the Israeli occupation. Over the last two years, independent armed groups affiliated to Fatah have begun to organise militarily. While known collectively as the Al Aqsa Brigades, these groups operate on the local level with little central coordination or control.

This phenomenon has wreaked havoc within Fatah on the political level, as the Al Aqsa Brigades have acted independently of the central leadership of Fatah and often in joint operations with the PFLP, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Al Aqsa Brigades represent a grassroots military resistance and are composed of local activists who are not "returnees" — a term used derisively for Fatah members who returned to Palestine following the Oslo Accords and took up comfortable positions within the PA.

This grassroots Fatah is particularly strong in the refugee camps in towns of northern West Bank, such as Jenin, Tulkarem and Nablus. They reflect a class difference with the PA and Fatah leaderships, whose economic security relies upon their relationship as a group with the Israeli capitalist economy.

Abu Mazen is a open representative of the comprador Palestinian bourgeoisie that is the social base of the PA and Fatah leadership — he is a wealthy businessperson and his sons and associates own several major trading companies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Until recently, the PA leadership around Arafat has acted carefully in relation to the Al Aqsa Brigades. While disturbed by their independence and militancy, the PA leadership has at times given them verbal (and occasionally "under-the-table" financial) support. Many Fatah leaders fear that directly taking on the Al Aqsa Brigades risks an irreparable split within the movement.

This is the contradiction that lies at the heart of the dispute between Abu Mazen and Arafat and is reflected in the public reason for the split — who is to control the Palestinian security forces. Abu Mazen insists that Mohammed Dahlan become minister of the interior, the position responsible for controlling the security forces. Arafat prefers one of his close associates, Hani Hassan, to be in charge.

Dahlan was previously in charge of the Gaza Preventive Security, a security force responsible for the close coordination with the Israelis in arresting political opponents of the Oslo process prior to the current intifada. Dahlan is a relative newcomer to Fatah and has little support within the organisation.

Hani Hassan is one of the historical leaders of Fatah and represents the Islamic trend within the movement. As such, he has a strong base of support within Fatah. He has been minister of the interior for about six months and has strong links with other Arab secret services, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, as well as with the CIA and the French secret police.

The minister of the interior will be a central player in the emerging "road map" framework. The Palestinian security services' principal role will be to disarm and demobilise the political factions, particularly Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and the Al Aqsa Brigades. They will be responsible for controlling popular opposition to the political framework demanded by the US and EU throughout the "road map" process.

Over a few days of dramatic negotiations in mid-April, in which Abu Mazen threatened to resign three times, it looked possible that Arafat may get his way and appoint a new prime minister in his place. However, a series of threatening phone calls to Arafat from the US, Britain and Arab leaders made it clear that progress towards the "road map" would be contingent on Abu Mazen's success.

These threats culminated with the visit of the head of Egypt's secret police to Arafat's compound on April 23, in which a deal was worked out in which prime minister-designate Abu Mazen was also appointed minister of the interior and Dahlan was given a newly created position of head of security affairs. The deal was met with strong approval from the Israeli government, which is now talking about immediately resuming negotiations with the Palestinians.

There are strong indications that the Palestinian security forces are preparing to return to the Palestinian "street". Palestinian police can be seen training in various compounds around the West Bank, and in some cases have resumed low-level duties such as directing traffic. More ominous are plans for a new security force that will accompany the "road map". This force will be the highest security body in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its members will be vetted by the Israeli security forces. It will be supervised by the CIA and training will be undertaken by Egyptian and Jordanian security forces, both infamous for their repression of their own people.

In order to strengthen his position within Fatah, Abu Mazen has been approaching governors of major Palestinian towns to win their support by promising them positions in the new Palestinian cabinet. While he has had some success, it remains clear that he has very little popular support within Fatah or broader Palestinian society.

Why the 'road map'?

It may seem strange that the Palestinian leadership should be so willing to enter into a process of negotiation that is so utterly at odds with Palestinian self-determination. Indeed, the "road map" is almost unanimously viewed with distrust at the popular level. Key to understanding this is a correct analysis of the Oslo process and the aims of both Israeli and foreign capital in the region.

The 1993 Oslo accords were never about "peace" or self-determination, rather they were aimed at establishing the cantonised Palestinian state that is emerging now. Since 1967, Israel has been pushing plans aimed at ensuring its control over the land and economy, but without direct military rule over the Palestinian population. The key to achieving this goal is to give Palestinians "self-rule", a limited form of self-government and the appearance of statehood and self-determination. In reality, final control would remain in Israeli hands through its control over borders and, most importantly, the economy.

The economic relationship between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories is key to the riddle. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have virtually no independent economy or industry. The Palestinian economy is completely integrated into, and dependent upon, Israel's economy. Approximately 75% of all imports to the Occupied Territories originate in Israel, while 95% of exports are destined for Israel. Israel's complete control over all external borders mean that it is very difficult for the Palestinian economy to develop meaningful trade relations with other countries. The Occupied Territories are highly dependent on imported goods, with total imports amounting to approximately 80% of GDP. In such a situation of very weak local production and high dependence on imports, the economy is very vulnerable to Israeli border closures and internal curfews.

Almost 20% of the Palestinian labour force worked inside Israel prior to the current intifada. As a result of the closures, curfews and movement restrictions, most of these workers have lost their jobs. Today, the majority of the Occupied Territories' population is reliant upon the PA for their livelihood, either through direct salaries or via other forms of support.

The PA is dependent upon foreign funds for its continued functioning. In 2001, these funds covered about 75% of the PA's salary budget. Without this money, 122,000 public sector employees would not have been paid. In addition, foreign donors support emergency programs such as food relief, employment creation schemes and reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed by Israel's military attacks. The Occupied Territories' total trade deficit is 45 50% of GDP and this is principally financed by foreign aid.

In such an environment, the local Palestinian capitalist class is not fundamentally based on domestic productive activities but rather draws its profits from its relationship with Israeli and foreign companies. The PA represents this class and central figures in the PA also own key import and export companies. This comes with a political price: the continued survival of the PA is dependent upon its privileged relationship with Israeli and foreign capitalist largesse in the form of loans and grants.

On the Israeli side, there is widespread recognition that a political solution must be found to the intifada. Israel's economy has entered its worst crisis in history, largely as a result of the Palestinian intifada and its effect on the economy. Israel's capitalist class, backed by the US, sees this political solution in the form of Palestinian "self-rule" and cantonisation. They hope that once this is achieved, the Occupied Territories will once again provide a source of skilled, cheap labour for Israeli capitalists as well as providing a captive market. Perhaps more significantly, an environment of "peace" will open up other Arab markets to Israeli big business and make the Israeli economy more attractive to investors.

The next few months will be critical to the future of the Palestinian struggle for national self-determination. The major obstacle to the scenario described above is the self-organisation and mobilisation of the oppressed Palestinian people. A similar situation occurred in 1993 with the Oslo accords. At that time, however, a majority of the population was convinced by the illusory promises of peace and self-determination. This was further reinforced by the widespread belief, promoted through the international media and by some in the solidarity movement, that negotiations were a stepping-stone to self-determination.

Ten years of experience has done much to disavow the local population of this false belief, as has the massive acceleration of "facts on the ground" in the form of Israeli settlements, roads and walls.

From Green Left Weekly, May 7, 2003.
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