Palestine in Crisis: The struggle for peace and political independence after Oslo
By Graham Usher
Pluto Press, 1995. 146 pp., $29.95
Reviewed by Adam Hanieh
Despite the almost universal praise by the establishment media for the Palestinian-Israeli "peace" process, the events of recent months indicate that a just solution has not yet been reached. Israeli land confiscation continues at an unprecedented rate and unemployment remains at untenable levels amongst Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israeli closure of borders and raids into so-called autonomous areas have indicated that control still rests in the hands of the occupiers.
Journalist Graham Usher has lived in Gaza for a number of years and contributes regularly to the highly regarded publications Middle East Report and Middle East International. Usher makes no pretence of so-called "balanced" journalism (which most often ends up as support for the status quo) but combines insightful analysis with a deeply felt sense of justice.
Usher begins by describing the impetus for the Madrid peace conference of October 1991. He identifies the positive dynamic that this process potentially contained such as the winning of the moral high ground by the Palestinian delegation and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the eyes of the world.
However, he also points out that the negotiations were taking place in the context of the demobilisation of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. "In the wake of the PLO's 1982 military defeat in Lebanon the occupied territories had become the principal site of the national struggle. The 1987-88 outbreak of the uprising and especially the emergence of the United National Leadership (UNL), a body ... relatively independent from [the Tunis-based PLO leadership], was the subjective expression of this reality."
He goes on to explain that the PLO leadership had no political strategy that addressed the situation in the territories concurrent with the diplomatic process.
However, the Madrid process was never consummated. Secret negotiations began between the PLO and the Israeli government in January 1993 that were to end with the September 1993 Declaration of Principles, otherwise known as the Oslo Agreement.
Oslo established a timetable for negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government. It contained provisions for Israeli army withdrawal from certain parts of the occupied territories in which a Palestinian administration would be established that would have control over education and culture, health, welfare, tourism and direct taxation. Significantly, it would not control defence or foreign affairs.
Oslo also provided for Palestinian elections (which took place on January 20) and further negotiations to address questions such as Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and refugees from 1948 (the year when Palestinians were first removed from their land to make way for the establishment of Israel).
The agreement was generally welcomed, as PLO leader Marwan Barghouti said: "... the political space it opens up enables us to set off an irreversible dynamic [towards independence] through the new national mechanisms we have set in place".
However, the opinions of several prominent Palestinians were decidedly less optimistic. Haidar abd al-Shafi, the head of the Palestinian negotiating team in Madrid, claimed that it would lead to "a kind of apartheid". Palestinian intellectual Edward Said called it an "instrument of Palestinian surrender, a Palestinian Versailles".
The PLO central committee of October 1993 voted a 68 to 8 endorsement of the agreement, but there was a boycott by 25 members allied with the opposition PLO factions Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
Usher believes that the agreement could have gone in two directions, either furthering the cause of Palestinian statehood or resulting in the cooption and surrender of the movement. The key determining factor would be the ability of the Palestinian leadership to mobilise the population and continually raise the consciousness of the people through explaining the necessity of particular tactical decisions and the strategic path being followed. With hindsight, Usher concludes that the central leadership of the PLO has proven incapable of accomplishing that task.
Following the Oslo Agreement, the PLO signed other agreements that Usher argues submitted to Israeli demands on a number of key issues. The Cairo agreement, signed on February 9, 1994, enabled Israel to construct roads that would cross the territories and remain completely under the control of the Israeli Defence Force. Israel would also gain control over all borders of the territories.
One of the most problematic concessions was the agreement to consider the Israeli settlements as "blocs", thus significantly increasing the amount of territory under Israeli control.
Usher also documents life under Arafat's rule in the Palestinian-controlled areas. He claims that opposition voices have been silenced and newspapers which criticise PNA policy have been closed down.
One of the strengths of Usher's account is his detailing of the on-the-ground movements and opposition currents within the leadership bodies. Following the arrival of Arafat in the occupied territories in June 1994, Arafat's faction Fateh broke into rival armed gangs. "We have stopped the armed struggle for the time being. I am now playing the part of a policeman, to supervise the population", said one of the leaders of a Fateh-aligned armed group.
Opposition within Fateh to Arafat's direction has also been strong. In November 1994, elections were organised in the West Bank town of Ramallah for the local Fateh leadership. There were two tickets put up, one aligned with Arafat and the other an independent slate; in the poll of 583 Fateh members, every position on the 15-seat executive went to the independents. Usher points out that these elections were significant because those elected were from the activist community rather than the "notables" put up by Arafat.
Usher has included a valuable chapter on the Islamic movements. He locates the reasons for their growth in "the unaccountable, authoritarian and autocratic national leadership". The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) also provides a strong network of social services that the PNA has proven incapable of matching.
Perhaps the most important feature of Palestine in Crisis is the overall analysis that Usher provides of the reasons underlying imperialist support for the peace process. He explains that following the 1990 Gulf War, imperialism began to seek a solution of the Palestinian problem in order to extend market access in the region. Israel plans to construct industrial zones along the borders of the occupied territories that would be staffed by cheap Palestinian labour.
The PLO has agreed to this and has also signed an economic agreement with Israel that allows a veto of any import into Palestinian territory that would threaten Israel's exclusive access to the market. This agreement also enables Israel to dictate the type of economic development that will occur in the occupied territories, ensuring that any Palestinian economy will remain a mere adjunct to the Israeli economy.
Usher says, "Israel's strategic aim has been to achieve a high degree of economic integration with the Arab world, to gain access to Arab markets, and to breach the 46 year old economic boycott of Israel".
Usher's book is a fine account of the situation facing the Palestinian movement following the peace accords. The Palestinian "question" is far from solved. Journalists such as Graham Usher do much to demystify the situation and raise questions that are key to building a democratic and secular Palestinian national movement.