At the end of last week, Green Left Weekly spoke to political economist at the University of Malaya Professor JOMO K. S. about the developments in Malaysia.
Question: What do you think is happening in Malaysian politics?
Many informed observers seem to think that Dr Mahathir decided Anwar could no longer be trusted to protect Mahathir's interests anymore, especially after Mahathir is no longer prime minister.
He was certainly not pleased when he went away for two months in mid-1997 and Anwar gave the impression that he was going to be tougher than the PM on corruption. When Mahathir took over economic policy after his return, the foreign media began mocking his conspiracy analysis, running him down and promoting the idea of an early Anwar succession.
From the end of '97, Anwar seemed to take over economic policy, cutting government spending, raising interest rates and tightening liquidity, which arguably exacerbated the crisis and took the economy into recession in 1998.
But I think the straw that broke the camel's back came in late May with developments in Indonesia and the subsequent adoption of the "reformasi" slogan and the anti-KKN (corruption, cronyism, nepotism) campaign by the UMNO Youth leaders. They were close to Anwar. I don't think Mahathir minded the attack on corruption and cronyism, but nepotism came too close to the bone.
Several months earlier, Malaysian People's Party president Dr Syed Husin Ali and a couple of associates had asked the Anti-Corruption Agency to investigate how Mahathir's three sons had gained stock in more than 200 companies by late 1994.
Suharto's resignation on May 21, and the continued attacks on the ex-president (who had only recently joined the ranks of Forbes magazine's richest people in the world) must have upset Mahathir, even though there are important differences between the two.
Question: But the charges against Anwar were raised earlier, at the 1997 UMNO general assembly.
I am not sure; many believe that some of Anwar's enemies had hatched the plot to finish off Anwar politically before then, but Mahathir still felt Anwar was the PM's least problematic option and was not willing to go along with them at that point.
Question: So you agree with those in Mahathir's camp that Anwar was going for the prime ministership?
Perhaps, but if Anwar's camp was making a bid, it was naive, ill-considered and bound to fail. Mahathir is not Suharto. He will go with his boots on. I don't believe he was about to quit, to give way to Anwar. Besides wanting to cling on to power for all the usual reasons, I think Mahathir honestly believes he is the best thing Malaysia has ever had and could hope for.
Question: If Anwar was not going for the prime ministership, what was happening?
Anwar's assembly speech did not criticise Mahathir at all, and in fact announced a U-turn from his December 1997 economic policy, by increasing government spending and liquidity and trying to lower interest rates, almost as if in response to Mahathir's earlier criticisms.
Maybe Anwar was keeping his cards very close to his chest, but he did not respond positively to those who called for him to lead us out of this darkness, and even went out of his way to explain Mahathir's concerns.
There is little evidence of any serious effort by Anwar's camp to mobilise forces and resources to oust Mahathir. Pointed criticism of nepotism, yes, but an effective plan or strategy to oust Mahathir, unlikely. If there was one, it was terribly amateurish and bound to fail.
But whatever it was, it was enough to convince Mahathir that Anwar was out to replace him.
Although it was later evident that a purge of Anwar's camp had begun, beginning with the media, I thought Mahathir had Anwar exactly where he wanted him — weakened, compliant and constrained from mounting an effective challenge. I wrongly thought Mahathir would prefer the safety of such an arrangement to risking an Anwar challenge by sacking him.
But, probably, in their calculations, Anwar's only real strength is his popularity, based on his personal charisma and moral standing; hence the need to destroy his reputation.
Given the reputations of many ministers in this country, straightforward adultery or the like would not be bad enough to damage Anwar irreparably — thus the need for something truly scandalous, like sodomy allegations given the presumed homophobia in our society.
At first, in the earlier version in the slander sheet at the 1997 assembly, the allegations seemed plausible. But they eventually made so many allegations, probably making them up as they went along in the hope that at least a few of them would stick and do the necessary damage, that they lost credibility.
They have been their own worst enemies. Their flagrant disregard for at least nominally complying with accepted procedure has shocked even those usually blissfully insensitive to such matters. Whatever the reasons they did this, it backfired.
Question: How has it backfired?
As what happened began to sink in, popular support for Anwar quickly picked up. Yet, besides those completely committed to Anwar and those who reject everything Mahathir claims, there are many who might have been more receptive to Mahathir's claims if not for the manner in which he, the police and the prosecutors have conducted themselves.
The arrest of those closest to Anwar in UMNO and ABIM (the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), and of related leaders under the Internal Security Act has reminded everyone what Anwar's dismissal is all about; that is, not sex, but power.
Just look at the Inspector General of Police's press conference, where he unwittingly managed to convince those present that Malaysia is becoming a police state. Or former deputy prime minister Ghafar's Jakarta visit, where he managed to insult and antagonise almost everyone there. Or Mahathir's claim that Anwar may have deliberately injured himself in the left eye to gain public sympathy.
Question: So what changes do you see occurring?
There seems to be an irreversible sea change going on in Malay political culture.
Most non-Malays are watching quietly from the sidelines, partly because they see this as an intra-Malay affair but also because of the fear of violence. It must be remembered that the May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpar and the May 1998 events in Jakarta were particularly traumatic for ethnic Chinese. Their fear is that desperate politicians may chose to play the ethnic card, the traditional card of first choice in Malaysian politics.
Among Malays, even before Anwar was sacked, there was a quiet, but widespread sympathy for jailed Democratic Action Party secretary general and MP Lim Guan Eng.
This was not necessarily support for the DAP, but tremendous unease at the great injustice involved in jailing an opposition politician for championing the cause of an under-age girl who had been raped, with the man widely believed to be responsible touring the country to speak at rallies supporting the Prime Minister.
Question: How do you think the situation will develop?
It's still difficult to say, but Anwar's dismissal and the aftermath have further undermined Malay public confidence in the regime and the leader, greatly increasing the number of Malays who can say "no" and opening up a new conjuncture in Malaysian politics.
Anwar's forces have no choice but to build a broad coalition with existing opposition forces, in which they hope to and should play a leading role.
With limited and deteriorating public confidence in the judicial system and process, the increasingly shared belief is that only an electoral victory from their combined strength can reverse Anwar's expected fate.
That is still very much an uphill task, but the unexpected developments and accompanying effervescence are also forcing ordinary people to think of alternatives, of reform, of new institutions for the creation and sustenance of a more decent and just society free of the dominance of political business, money politics and related depravities. Beyond Mahathir versus Anwar, the legitimacy of many official institutions, especially among Malays, has been shaken as never before.
Contrary to some pronouncements, this is unlikely to descend into anarchy. Rather, it is leading to greater demands for democracy and accountability, though not necessarily in that language. While the reform movement may fail, Malaysian politics and political culture will never be the same again.