By Boris Kagarlitsky
MOSCOW — Early in September, the main theme of political forecasts in Russia was the supposedly imminent resignation of President Boris Yeltsin. Anyone with even the slightest knowledge of Yeltsin, however, regarded all this with unconcealed irony. When the question of Yeltsin's resignation was put to former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, he snapped: "Just so long as he goes, for god's sake!".
But what if he doesn't go? The politicians in the Duma, anticipating trouble, are hurriedly preparing a law providing guarantees for the president and the members of his family after his resignation. From the moral and legal points of view, this proposal is monstrous. If the law is adopted, Russia will become the first country in the world where the highest representative of the state power is granted the right to commit any crimes whatever during his term in office.
And not just the president, but also his family. It is not yet clear to what degree of kinship this immunity extends. Does it include sons-in-law, grandchildren, great-grandchildren? But it is clear that the family of the next president will enjoy the same rights. From now until the end of time, the country's highest public officials will be legally permitted to steal, take bribes and breach the constitution — perhaps even to kill their opponents.
It is true that under the constitution the president can be impeached, but Yeltsin and his successors will not bear responsibility for their actions, even if driven from office, something that in our conditions is highly unlikely.
In some monarchic states, the ruling family enjoys such immunity as its birthright. This is a holdover from medieval times. Russia will perhaps be the first country to bring in medievalism in the name of democracy.
This absurd subterfuge, we should note, will not work in any case. Yeltsin is not holding on to power because he fears punishment for his real or imagined misdeeds. If he has done anything illegal, it is because he loves power, not the reverse. He will, of course, be ready to make use of the proposed immunity in the interests of his family, but all the same, he will not give up power.
Accomplices
Secondly, the list of people to whom immunity extends will have to be broadened almost without limit, to include officials of the presidential administration, ministers and advisers. However great Yeltsin's power, he does not rule alone, and in taking decisions he keeps one eye on his entourage.
For this entourage, it will be mortally dangerous if Yeltsin is removed from jeopardy. After what has happened over the past 10 years, someone will have to be made the scapegoat.
It would be one thing if all the blame is heaped on Yeltsin, in the same way as at the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Joseph Stalin (who by that time had died) was forced to answer for all the crimes of the party and the state security organs. All of Stalin's accomplices, the people who had put his orders into effect, lived out their lives comfortably in government dachas.
It would be something quite different if the head of state, like Caesar's wife, turns out to be above suspicion. In this case, other people will answer for everything. That is something for Yeltsin's entourage to be really alarmed about.
Aggravating the situation has been the scandal with the Bank of New York. Earlier, Russian embezzlers knew that if they encountered any "unpleasantness", they could head off to the "civilised countries" where their capital had already been sent.
They no longer have this guaranteed escape route; their money might be confiscated, and they themselves, heaven forbid, might be put on trial. Things are more peaceful in the homeland; so long as power remains in the embezzlers' hands, there will be no investigations or confiscations.
For the Kremlin "family", things would be most tranquil if Yeltsin were to continue ruling for life, before being laid to rest in the mausoleum, next to or in place of Lenin. Then, all the crimes could be heaped on his head. Historical justice would triumph, and no-one would suffer.
The desire of the "family" to maintain its prosperity finds its match in Yeltsin's reluctance to hand over power. A practical solution to this problem, however, will not be so simple.
Even a coup d'etat requires a suitable pretext and reliable people to carry it out. At present, both are hard to come by. Most importantly, the political elites cannot unite around the president as they did in 1993 and 1996.
In this situation, the best course for Yeltsin is to start everything again from the beginning, changing not only the rules of the game, but also the players themselves. This is why he needs his new prime minister, Vladimir Putin.
A precedent?
In a comparable situation 60 years ago, Stalin thrust the unknown functionary Yezhov into the limelight, and charged him with making short work of the old Soviet elite. Yezhov lacked his own political base, did not have his own people in the structures of power and was unknown to the public. Nevertheless, he kept the organs of repression under tight control. Then, at the end of the blood-letting, Yezhov himself shared the fate of his victims.
If we consider Putin, the thought thrusts itself upon us: are we not faced with the reincarnation of Yezhov? Of course, the times now are more humane, and it must be hoped that the victims of the new purges will not be dispatched physically but politically.
All the same, the authorities will not get by without harsh authoritarian measures. If these are not aimed at the elite, they could well be directed against ordinary citizens. The natural and logical development of events includes war in Chechnya, an associated strengthening of the role of the repressive apparatus, control of the streets by the police and the gradual introduction of media censorship.
Putin, unlike Yezhov, is developing his power under the conditions of more or less liberal capitalism, and the full arsenal of totalitarian rule cannot be brought into operation. This, however, is not needed. The Kremlin is not by any means compelled to control everyone and everything; the main thing is not to allow effective resistance to its plans.
Only one mistake
Two unresolved questions remain: how far the Kremlin will be prepared to go if it decides to pursue this course, and whether Yeltsin will be able to keep control of the situation once the move is made.
Putin also knows history, and will recall Yezhov's fate. Once again, the times are different and the most that threatens Putin once his labours are complete is honourable exile to some second-rate government office.
However, someone who has wielded vast, almost dictatorial powers might not agree to depart quietly from the scene, and unless Putin is given such powers, he will be unable to do the job Yeltsin requires of him.
The Putin administration, it follows, might end quite differently from the Yezhov one. Yeltsin's statement praising Putin as a future president might turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Moreover, there is the following prospect: as someone who was not complicit in Yeltsin's earlier moves, Putin might not merely get out of control, he might also make scapegoats of his former patrons. For the present, of course, he is absolutely loyal, but what might be the situation in six months' time?
If Putin justifies the hopes placed in him and proves a "strong" prime minister, he could turn out to be too strong for the Kremlin. If, on the other hand, he proves weak, the game that is being played out could end in catastrophe both for Yeltsin and for Putin.
Until now, Yeltsin has always found a way out of the crises he himself has set up. More than likely, his intuition will not let him down this time either. But in the Kremlin, a politician, like a bomb-disposal expert, never gets to make more than one mistake. What if the appointment of Putin turns out to be the president's sole, fateful error?
Such concerns might deter the Kremlin from taking excessive risks. If anything can now save the remnants of democracy in Russia, it is the political leadership's fear of the consequences of its own decisions.