MADAGASCAR: Tottering on the edge of revolution

May 8, 2002
Issue 

BY LEO ZEILIG

Madagascar is best known for its unique wildlife and as a destination for Western tourists, who are keen, according to a recently published tourist guide, for a "taste of the exotic". However, largely ignored by the international press, for the last four months, Madagascar has been tottering on the edge of revolution.

The political upheaval on the Indian Ocean Island, off the east coast of southern Africa, can be briefly summarised: a disputed election result in a Third World country ravaged by "market reforms" for almost 20 years; a repressive incumbent regime determined to hold onto power is confronted by a mass uprising that supports a popular opposition candidate, a businessperson and multi-millionaire who espouses neo-liberal "Washington consensus" economics, who has been pushed by the masses to take more decisive action than he intended.

Popular struggle has characterised political change in Madagascar before and since the country won its independence in 1960. The island was a French colony from 1886. By the late 1940s, thousands had been killed in a rebellion against the colonial occupiers.

After years of decline, protests in 1972 led to a new government which reoriented the Madagascar from France towards the Soviet Union. Three years later, Lieutenant-Colonial Didier Ratsiraka became head of state. By the late 1980s, despite the government's professed "socialism", Ratsiraka's government was implementing "market reforms" and structural adjustment programs at the behest of the International Monetary Fund.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Madagascar was gripped by demonstrations and a growing opposition movement. Ratsiraka refused to concede to its demands and 130 people were murdered by government forces when crowds gathered outside the presidential palace demanded the president's resignation.

The pressure continued, which forced Ratsiraka to allow a democratic election in 1993. The new president, Albert Zafy, failed to stem the economic crisis and Ratsiraka was reelected in 1996 amidst widespread apathy.

The Madagascan economy, coffee and vanilla being the country's main exports, has continued to be buffeted by the rise and fall of commodity prices. In a country of 16 million, life expectancy has fallen to about 54 years and the people's average annual per capita income is less than US$260. Madagascar ranks as the world's eighth poorest country.

Rigged election

On December 16, the official results of the first round of the presidential election were announced. President Didier Ratsiraka secured 40% of the vote, while the opposition candidate, the mayor of the Malagasy capital Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana, took 46%. As neither candidate achieved an overall majority, a second round was planned for March.

In January, the opposition declared that the poll had been rigged and that Ravalomanana was the winner, with 53% of the vote. By mid-January, huge daily demonstrations had erupted in the capital. A few hundred thousands at first, then half a million, followed by almost a million protesters who mobilised to demand a new government.

On January 28, strikes were called in protest at the High Court's ruling ordering a second round of voting. The strike quickly spread, leading to the suspension of international flights and paralysis of both the public and private sector. From the end of January until the middle of March, Madagascar was in the grip of its biggest general strike in the country's history.

The mood shifted from uncertainty and fear — that, like 1991, there would be a massacre of protesters — to confidence and jubilation. "This is a soft revolution; it is a bit like a holiday every day", commented one demonstrator.

The opposition was far from clear about what to do. On a demonstration of half a million on February 6, in response to the demonstrators' urgings that he seize power, Ravalomanana preached caution and patience.

"We cannot take power just like that. I have to respect the norms, notably our relations with the big powers", Ravalomanana said. These comments prompted anger and jeers from the crowd. "Be patient. I have a plan. I cannot unveil it now, but we will soon end up taking power", he promised. (Ravalomanana's plan amounted to a legal appeal to the constitutional court.)

'Take power!'

Cries went up for him to "take power by force". Ravalomanana flapped and vacillated, coughed into the microphone, and repeated that he had a "plan". Should he take the masses advice? Was it sensible to take power on the back of a self-confident popular movement?

In the end, Ravalomanana was forced to take up the battle cry of the streets, declaring himself president in a ceremony on February 22. Suddenly, Madagascar had two presidents. The "legitimate" government seemed to almost vanish.

Ravalomanana named a new government. Its ministers, supported by hundreds of thousands of supporters, simply walked in and took over the government's Antananarivo offices. The police and army stood by, unable to prevent this by the sheer size of the opposition's support.

Ratsiraka declared martial law and imposed a night curfew; the population respected neither. Barricades went up in Antananarivo. Ratsiraka was forced from the capital and the crisis looked as though it had been resolved.

While the opposition's supporters urged Ravalomanana to seize power throughout the island, by force if necessary, the opposition leadership prevaricated. This vacillation gave the incumbent president and his supporters' crucial breathing space to consolidate its control of the rural areas.

Ratsiraka retreated from the capital to his home province, where he established a rival "capital" in Tamatave, the country's principal port.

In late February, soldiers loyal to Ratsiraka blew up bridges on the three main roads leading into Antananarivo, the most important one linking the capital with the Tamatave. The military blockade of the capital was intensified in March, starving its 2 million inhabitants of food, fuel and raw materials for the city's factories.

Still the opposition hesitated. Violence escalated as the opposition leaders failed to take the decisive steps that would have convinced the old government and the army that they were as serious as the strikers and demonstrators.

In the middle of March, Ravalomanana insisted that his supporters end the general strike. At the same time, Ratsiraka organised counter-demonstrations that led to the first casualties of the crisis.

Deal repudiated

Caught between the masses' demands for decisive action, the government's crippling blockade of the capital and pressure from African and Western governments to compromise, Ravalomanana accepted an offer by Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade to host "peace talks" in the Senegalese capital Dakar.

On April 18, the two "presidents" signed an accord in Senegal, which was celebrated as the "solution" to the crisis. Under the terms of the agreement, Ravalomanana would accept his rival's presidency for the time being and agreed to be Ratsiraka's "deputy" in a "transitional" government pending the resolution of who had won the December 16 election. The votes in the original presidential ballot would be recounted by the constitutional court; both candidates agreed to accept the result. If neither had an absolute majority then a referendum would be held within six months to choose between the two candidates.

In return, Ratsiraka promised to immediately end the crippling blockade of Antananarivo. However, the five provincial governors loyal to Ratsiraka refused to lift the blockade, announcing on April 23 that it would only be lifted when Ravalomanana dismantles his government.

On April 26, the governor of Tamatave province threatened to establish a separate state if the constitutional court ruled in favour of Ravalomanana. On April 28, Ratsiraka also declared that he would not accept the results of the recount if it confirmed that Ravalomanana had won the election.

On April 29, the constitutional court announced that the recount had given Ravalomanana almost 51.5% of the vote, while Ratsiraka had received just 36%.

So within days of embracing his opponent and renouncing the presidency, Ravalomanana is planning to hold his second presidential inauguration. Huge numbers of his supporters danced in the street when the results were announced.

Meanwhile, the "official" government, entrenched in Tamatave, is escalating its blockade of the capital and is demanding a referendum to "end" the crisis.

Four of Madagascar's six provincial governors have backed the idea of a pro-Ratsiraka "confederation of self-governing states", a plan that will make the island ungovernable.

As an Organisation of African Unity delegation was scheduled to return to the island on May 1 for more "negotiations", the question remains: will the opposition lean on its mass popular support and finally move to crush the old government?

What next?

Madagascar has shown how mass mobilisation can force an entrenched and violent government out of power. But it also highlights how crucial political leadership is. There is no sizable revolutionary current inside the Malagasy working class that could push the movement beyond the timidity and conservatism of the official capitalist opposition.

This failure has meant that Ravalomanana, himself a product of the strikes and mass demonstrations, could eventually force Madagascans to retreat and accept a political compromise far short of what is possible.

Can the genie of mass protest be put back in the bottle so easily? Will Ravalomanana's supporters accept such a compromise so readily? The presidency was given to the opposition by the streets and not granted by the "official" government. Elie Rajaonarison, an advisor to Ravalomanana recently observed, "The people are fed up, and they want to act ... for now, we are calming people down, but how long can that last?".

The example of Madagascar is being watched closely in Africa. As the Economist magazine noted: "Zimbabweans ... are observing with interest how civilian pressure may bring a popular candidate to office against the odds".

[Leo Zeilig is a coordinator of Zimbabwe Indymedia (<http://zimbabwe.syntac.net/>) and is the editor of Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa (New Clarion Press) due out in June.]

From Green Left Weekly, May 8, 2002.
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