KURDISTAN: 'The PKK is threatened with decay'
On February 16, 1999, Abdullah Ocalan, the chairperson of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), was kidnapped by Turkish intelligence in Nairobi, Kenya, and taken to the prison island of Imrali. Twelve months later, the PKK held its 7th Party Congress and distanced itself from the armed struggle.
But this new line has been controversial, both in Turkey and abroad. A prominent critic of the PKK's new strategy has been SELAHATTIN CELIK, a Kurdish author and publicist who now lives in Cologne, Germany. Celik, who was a member of the PKK's central committee for many years, was attacked in his home in the summer of 1999 and warned against making further public criticisms of the PKK.
He was interviewed by PETER NOWAK for Freitag.
Question: Since the imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, statements from the PKK have taken on a new tone. Now the party is even seeking Turkey's admission into the European Union (EU). How can this drastic reversal be explained?
The PKK not only led the longest guerilla struggle in Kurdish history, during that time it also politicised millions of people. The PKK was present in all sectors of the society.
Question: You mean, the PKK was like that up until today?
No, the crisis began as early as the 1990s with the mass movement of the Kurdish population, which led to uprisings and strikes against Turkey's policies, and which were forcibly repressed by the Turkish army.
This led to drastic changes in the social structures in Kurdistan. When the PKK began its struggle, Kurdistan was primarily an agrarian society. The dirty war waged by the Turkish military forced many Kurds to migrate to the major cities.
The PKK's fighters were increasingly forced out of Turkish territory and into south Kurdistan — Iraqi territory. This resulted in a majority of the fallen guerillas dying in clashes with other Kurdish groups, not in clashes with the Turkish army. The PKK never found an answer to these ever-changing conditions.
Question: What effects did the collapse of the socialist bloc have on the movement?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the only world superpower left, and it was not going to allow an independent Kurdistan to be created. The already weakened Turkish left lost more ground after 1989, while Turkish chauvinism made great advances.
The alliance with Turkish leftist forces called for in the PKK's party program began to take second place to tactical alliances with states like Syria — or Russian nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who gave Ocalan shelter during his flight to Russia in autumn 1998.
Question: How much responsibility does Ocalan bear for the situation you have outlined?
He has been a charismatic leader for 25 years — the party was, ever since the beginning, based around him.
The central committee was changed, or completely removed, according to Ocalan's whim. Even the operations of the Kurdish TV station MED-TV were dependent on Ocalan. One phone call from him and the entire team of directors was replaced.
So the PKK's ideology became gradually transformed into an Ocalan ideology. In Kurdish exile communities, there have always been intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals who gladly emulated Ocalan's words.
Question: What did that mean after Ocalan's arrest?
It was very simple. The Turkish military told him, you founded the PKK, and now you will disband it.
There have been no negotiations between the Turkish state and Ocalan. There have only been orders — and Ocalan has followed these orders.
He said during his trial that the Kurds had never fought for independence and that armed resistance had been a mistake from the beginning. The things which the Turkish general staff used to say are now coming out of Ocalan's mouth. Of course that led to a great deal of confusion among the Kurdish people.
Question: But what alternatives were there?
The PKK could have developed democratic alternatives to Ocalan, if there had been a free discussion among the Kurdish intellectuals.
Before his arrest, Ocalan often said, "If something happens to me, then the Kurdish cause is lost". But no precautions were taken to prevent this from happening.
It's a fatal mistake that Ocalan is still the leader of the PKK, still making decisions, even though he's in the hands of the enemy. Any other army would have replaced its commander-in-chief right away.
In fact, the PKK hinted at that at first when it said, "Ocalan is our chairman, but he is in prison. His orders are no longer binding." Inexplicably, however, they reversed this position. It seems the leadership is afraid to take on its responsibilities.
Question: Several PKK prisoners have distanced themselves from the new line, entire guerilla units are refusing to demobilise. What chances does a PKK opposition have?
The new line of the PKK is being supported by NATO, the Kurdish party HADEP, and a large segment of the Kurdish population who are tired of war. Others hope that things will now improve.
The opposition to the new line, on the other hand, is a fading minority. So the PKK opposition will not affect much. Instead, I fear that the PKK is threatened with a long-term process of decay.
[Abridged from the February 18 issue of Freitag. Translated by Arm The Spirit, at <http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/>.]