BY STUART MUNCKTON
"The strike that once left most commercial areas of the city dark and abandoned — at an economic cost of more than $50 million a day — is now a collage of contrasts: abandoned shopping malls and bustling street markets ... shuttered McDonald's outlets and packed gourmet restaurants. Venezuelan beer has been replaced by Mexican and German brands. Movie theatres are closed, but neighbourhoods are setting up screens in parks and plazas."
This is how the January 15 New York Times described the way ordinary Venezuelans are managing to live with the effects of the "general strike" organised by Venezuelan and US big business. The action, which is in reality a lock-out by bosses and managers, is an attempt to force the radical, pro-poor Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez from power.
On paper, the "general strike", which began on December 2, is deepening. In the first weeks of January, banks and supermarket chains joined the shut down and the right-wing opposition announced it would urge people not to pay income tax. In Venezuela, only the top 20% of the population pay income tax and these people can afford private health care and education. This means they will not suffer the consequences of the drop in public spending that would result from the non-payment of tax.
The decision of the banks to close for two days on January 9-10 resulted in an immediate 13% devaluation of the Venezuelan currency, the Bolivar, to a record low. The currency has since devalued a further 6%.
According to the Venezuela e-zine V-Headline, energy minister Rafael Ramirez estimated on January 13 that the bosses shut down, which he condemned as "an act of sabotage", has cost the country US$4 billion.
But while the "strike" has been economically damaging, it has little popular support and has failed in its goal of forcing Chavez to resign. Evidence is growing that the action is beginning to lose steam. The January 12 New York Times quoted leaders of the opposition umbrella group, the Democratic Co-ordinator, as acknowledging that the "strike" was failing, and suggesting the possibility of allowing more businesses and factories to re-open. Media and eyewitness reports repeatedly comment on the lack of any noticeable disruption to daily life outside the wealthy suburbs in eastern Caracas.
At the heart of the "strike" has been the oil industry, and it is continuing there in violation of a December ruling of the Supreme Court for a return to work. However, even here the government has continued to make ground, with a January 12 AP report quoting energy minister Ramirez predicting oil production would be back to pre-strike levels by the end of February.
The government is continuing its planned restructure of the state-owned oil company, with the aim of achieving complete government control of the company. So far, Chavez has announced the sacking of more than 1000 personnel for participating in the shut down and has appointed a new board to run the company.
The Chavez government is also pursuing more decisive measures against the opposition to break the "strike". In response to the community's anger at the decision by a number of school administrations not to open schools, and in some cases continue to charge tuition fees, Chavez urged on January 12 that parents take the schools over.
Chavez has declared his intention to use the military to seize idle food stocks and food production facilities to prevent food shortages and revitalise food production.
The January 14 edition of V-Headline reported that Chavez was threatening to revoke the broadcasting licenses of private TV and radio stations — a step long demanded by his supporters. This is in response to the open support by the private media of the opposition's sabotage of the economy and attempts to overthrow the government.
Private TV stations have long-ceased running commercials, replacing them with constant messages from the opposition. The stations give blanket coverage to anti-Chavez protests while ignoring often much larger pro-Chavez demonstrations. The private media has been reporting blatant lies and unsubstantiated rumours as fact for months. The owners of the private media have also backed, and been implicated in organising, the failed military coup last April.
The Chavez government has also taken further steps to bring the Caracas police force, which has been violently repressing pro-Chavez demonstrations, under control. Although the central government carried out a Supreme Court order to hand back control of the police force to the anti-Chavez mayor of Caracas, Alfredo Pena, on January 15, National Guard troops have entered police stations and seized weapons, tear gas canisters and rubber bullets. The government blames the Caracas police for the killings of two Chavez supporters at a demonstration in early January.
Despite the failure of the "strike" to force Chavez to resign or call early elections, the right-wing opposition is pushing ahead with plans to run a "consultative" referendum of their own, under the cover of the anti-Chavez National Electoral College. The opposition was planning to hold the referendum on February 2, but the with an estimated $22 million in costs to run it, they have postponed it and launched a campaign to raise funds. Chavez's party, the Movement for the Fifth Republic, has called for a boycott of the referendum and it is hard to see what a referendum held in such circumstances is likely to prove.
The opposition insists that the majority of Venezuelans no longer support Chavez, pointing to opinion polls which show support for Chavez as low as 30%. However, the polls cannot be considered a reliable gauge of public opinion.
Firstly, the pollsters do not poll outside of Caracas, where the majority of the population live and where poverty is greatest. This is where Chavez's reforms have had the biggest impact. Also, much of the polling is done over the phone, which by definition excludes most of the poor. Of course, the opposition does not take into consideration that a number of people are dissatisfied with Chavez not because they think he is too radical, but because they want his government to be more radical.
Regardless of the accuracy of the polls, 30% support is still greater than any individual leader of the opposition can boast of having.
From Green Left Weekly, January 22, 2003.
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