BY SARAH STEPHEN
A deepening of Australia's military alliance with the United States was heralded by the February 26 launch of Australia's National Security a Defence Update 2003. While much of the 25-page document foreshadows only marginal and rhetorical adjustments to defence policy, the update flags two significant changes to the 2000 defence white paper: more direct participation in the US strategic missile defence program and an increased likelihood of military involvement in coalition operations further afield.
The latter is justified on the basis of the changed global strategic environment ... shaped by the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the likelihood that Australian national interests could be affected by events outside of Australia's immediate neighbourhood.
Following talks between the two governments in 2001, Australia is making a concerted effort to enhance its armed forces' compatibility with the US military from communications systems to training and equipment.
The Australian government has its own reasons for operating as a willing and enthusiastic junior partner to the United States. In 1999, Howard referred to his government as Washington's deputy peacekeeper in the Asia-Pacific region. While he later attempted to distance himself from this comment, it remains true.
While the interests of US and Australian elites often diverge, the Howard government and its supporters believe that the US is an efficient enforcer of the system of global exploitation by First World big business, including Australian corporations. In defence minister Robert Hill's words, it is in Australias interests to work closely with [the US] in supporting a more secure and stable world.
But Howard and Hill also want a defence force capable of putting down insurgencies, revolts, revolutions or governments that challenge Australia's exploitation of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Defence Update 2003 makes it clear that the strengthening of the US alliance is not at the expense of the main thrust of the 200 white paper: equipping the Australian military to intervene more decisively in the Asia-Pacific region. Keeping this region secure for Australian and US corporations to continue to make profits remains a priority.
In recent months, the Australian government has signed anti-terrorism agreements with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and, on March 8, with Fiji. According to a March 4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade press release announcing the Philippines agreement, they provide a framework for increased cooperation between security, intelligence, law enforcement and defence officials.
Police commissioner Mick Keelty told Radio National's Asia-Pacific program on March 6 that the counter-terrorism agreements would ensure the region was safe for business.
Such agreements will give Australia important cover for intervening against local people's struggles, such as the Acehnese and West Papuan struggles for independence from Indonesia and the Moro people's independence fight in the southern Philippines. Some of the organisations involved in these struggles have already been identified on the United Nations' list of terrorist organisations.
Defence Update 2003 calls for an upgrading of links with Indonesia's brutal Kopassus special forces, on the pretext that it would improve Jakarta's ability to cope with terrorist threats. Eager to re-establish military ties with Jakarta, the Australian government is happy to overlook the fact that Kopassus forms part of one of the most brutal state terrorist forces in the region, overseeing ongoing brutality and killings in West Papua and Aceh.
At the same time as the white paper is being discussed, Howard's government signalled its support for the US National Missile Defence Scheme (NMD), dubbed the son of Star Wars scheme.
Misnamed as a defence system, NMD is designed to shore up the Washington's ability to attack whoever it likes, whenever it likes, with minimal risk of counterattack, to protect the interests of US imperialism at home and abroad.
Despite a vote condemning the scheme in the Senate last June, the Howard government is considering accepting the US government's offer of giving coverage to its allies with the defensive shield. Australia already plays an important role in supporting NMD through the US spy base at Pine Gap in South Australia.
Former US president Ronald Reagan's original scheme was supposed to provide protection from a massive Soviet nuclear strike (and would have been useful if the US chose to strike first).
Now, the Bush gang's justification for the NMD program is to prevent nuclear strikes by rogue states such as North Korea, which presently has no capacity to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (and won't for 10 years from the time it decides to build them); or from Iraq, Iran, Libya or Syria none of which has missiles capable of reaching the US.
Washington also argues that the US is vulnerable to attacks from terrorists who get their hands on ballistic missiles: also highly improbable.
In launching Defence Update 2003, Hill argued that NMD may be a necessary ... form of security protection. It seems that the tiny, impoverished nation of North Korea is the Howard government's enemy of choice, for now. Hill has described North Korea's long-range missile program as particularly worrying.
The Bush administration is also considering sea- and space-based systems. Sea-based systems (also known as Theatre Missile Defence) would aim to protect US troops overseas, as well as US allies such as Taiwan. There are also claims that US civilian and military satellites require protection and, therefore, a major militarisation of space.
The Howard government seems to be testing the waters on Australians support for the scheme. Despite Howards comments, the white paper is vague on the question. In a press conference to launch the white paper, Hill cautioned that it was a very complex, expensive, scientifically challenging task.
There are two reasons for concern about NMD. Much of the criticism of NMD has focused on the stupidity of the plan, since it is doubtful that a missile defence system could prevent even a limited, unsophisticated missile attack. Despite ploughing US$130 billion dollars since 1983 into developing and testing the scheme, most tests have failed. The challenge of knocking missiles out of the sky is akin to hitting a bullet with a bullet.
Secondly, and more seriously, US plans could spark new arms and missile races: Russia and China are likely to increase their own defensive systems in response. The arms build-up could spread to India, Pakistan and beyond. The extension of NMD to incorporate the defence of Australia, which would require the positioning of expensive ground- and sea-based missiles, draws this country very squarely into that arms race.
Australian support for NMD is critical, as much of the intelligence data for the NMD is gathered at Pine Gap. The Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation has been involved in collaborative research on ballistic missile detection with the US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation since 1995. The US military is also planning to establish a rocket range in Western Australia as a testing ground for its Theatre Missile Defence and already has the full support of the federal government.
In a February 27 article, the Australian's national security editor asks the question how much longer can Australia go on spending a niggardly 1.8% of GDP on defence, arguing that Hill's ambitious rhetoric in launching the update needed to be matched with genuine enhancement of Australia's overall military capacity.
Hill had originally argued within cabinet for a $1.5 billion funding boost, which was rejected. The final document makes no suggestion of a funding increase. The 2000 white paper already foreshadowed an increase in defence spending of $1 billion in the 2003-04 financial year. Whether more will be added will be revealed in the May federal budget.
From Green Left Weekly, March 12, 2003.
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