By Renfrey Clarke
MOSCOW — Within days of claiming victory in his April 25 referendum, Boris Yeltsin was moving ahead with plans to introduce a new constitution that would transform Russia into a "presidential republic".
On April 27 deputy prime minister Sergei Shakhrai claimed to reporters that the referendum results gave Yeltsin a mandate for such a move. As of April 29, however, the actual text of the president's new draft constitution still had not been published.
At the time voters went to the polling stations, all they had seen of Yeltsin's proposed "basic law" was a brief summary of its main principles. This summary was released on April 24, too late for jurists to examine it and make comments before the voting began.
If the text of Yeltsin's draft had been released in time for public discussion, a good many Russians would have been less inclined to express "confidence" in the president. Commenting on the summary, leading jurist Lev Okunkov observed in an interview published on April 28 that the draft constitution appeared to grant the Russian president powers resembling those of the tsars.
To judge from the published outline, in preparing the draft Yeltsin reviewed his experience as president and had the drafters systematically attack the legislative and judicial branches on every point where they have given him trouble.
Under the draft, the president will determine the procedures under which state organs function. The current parliament would be abolished and be replaced by a much smaller two chamber Federal Assembly. In contrast to the broad range of powers which legislatures normally enjoy in presidential systems, the new Russian parliament would be restricted almost exclusively to adopting legislation.
Of critical importance is that the president will have the unimpeded right to appoint and dismiss ministers; he or she will be required to consult with parliament on such appointments, but not to obtain parliament's agreement. In particular circumstances the president will be able to dissolve the legislature, a right which is not, for example, enjoyed by the president of the US. The parliament apparently is not even mentioned in relation to the calling of referendums; this right will belong exclusively to the president.
The Constitutional Court, which has angered Yeltsin with a string of soundly based decisions, will lose many of its powers to a new body, the Supreme Judicial Office. The president is also to obtain much greater power in the appointment of judges.
This is the kind of constitution Yeltsin would clearly like; whether he can secure it is another matter. Late in April, it was reported that he would present his draft to the heads of the 88 republics, and that when the draft had been worked through with the local executives, it would be put to the parliament. However, the local leaders, jealous of their power, can be expected to demand drastic revisions, and the parliament is in no mood to accept a document which could put the deputies out of work within a few months.
For these reasons, Yeltsin supporters are beginning moves to collect the million signatures needed to force the parliament to set a date for a referendum on a new constitution. Under the existing constitution, however, the success of such a referendum would require a majority not just of citizens who turned out to vote but of all eligible voters. The experience of the April 25 referendum, in which none of the four questions drew more than 41% support on this basis, suggests very strongly that this option is closed to Yeltsin as well.
That leaves the alternatives of force, fraud and violence. Liberal commentators in Russia are discounting charges that the president plans to violate the existing constitution in order to put his new regime in place. In mid-March, however, the same people were vigorously denying that Yeltsin planned to impose any kind of "special rule".