By Boris Kagarlitsky
MOSCOW — While Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and presidential chief of staff Anatoly Chubais jostle for power under Yeltsin, interior minister General Anatoly Kulikov is systematically occupying key positions.
The prospect is emerging that it will be Kulikov, rather than better-known rivals, who will reap the main rewards if Yeltsin's enfeeblement continues.
Kulikov is firmly installed in his post, and also has solid support from the Communist-led Duma "opposition". Both sides see him as someone who can defend them against enemies; cultivating him with additional powers thus appears a judicious tactic.
One recent development has been the decision to throw Interior Ministry employees into collecting taxes, despite the fact that tax police already exist to perform this role. Since tax collection is a central political issue, Kulikov's positions have been strengthened.
While Kulikov is not openly seeking a place at the apex of power, he is becoming an indispensable ally for the people who are out to score the top jobs. His positions grew stronger following the sacking of former security chief Aleksandr Lebed, and he has also benefited from the weakening of Chubais.
A report that Kulikov will be given the task of overseeing all the country's military and paramilitary structures has not received official confirmation, but has not been denied either. Also significant are the rapturous comments on Kulikov from banker and deputy secretary of the Security Council Boris Berezovsky.
Chechnya
For most people in the Russian military, the Chechen campaign was a disaster, but for Kulikov everything went ideally. Despite his personally commanding troops, and later directing the operations of Interior Ministry troops from his headquarters in Moscow, the defeats in the war did not damage either his career or his reputation.
At the time of the Budyonnovsk tragedy, Kulikov succeeded in forcing changes to the route taken by the buses with the hostages, thereby delaying the hostages' release. But it was interior minister Viktor Yerin who fell, while Kulikov took his place.
During the Pervomaysk stand-off Kulikov, together with chairperson of the Federal Security Service Barsukov, commanded 2500 hand-picked troops who failed to overcome a Chechen force a fraction of the size.
Barsukov was discredited, and came under attack in the press. Kulikov remained in the shadows. Now Barsukov has vanished from the political scene, while minister Kulikov complains that he was not allowed to smash the enemy.
The inability of the security apparatus to cope with terrorism has not affected Kulikov's career either. Strictly speaking, the acts of terrorism that have occurred in Russia during this period have benefited the state organs charged with preventing them. In order to deal with the threat, these organs have received additional powers and resources.
The recent terrorist acts began with a series of explosions in Moscow trolleybuses. These were completely pointless, since no-one put forward demands or claimed responsibility. Perhaps the terrorists simply hated trolleybuses?
Later, when the Interior Ministry organs had begun a massive anti-terrorist campaign, the acts unexpectedly ceased, though no-one was ever caught. Something very similar occurred recently in Chechnya.
One should not place any credence in the charges by the Chechen authorities that the terrorist acts have been inspired by the Russian security services, since there is no proof.
Whoever the people are who ordered the terror, they have not left any clues. However, it is easy to see who has profited.
The main purpose of the terrorist killings in Chechnya during the months leading up to the January 27 elections was probably to intimidate observers and to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the poll results in case of a future conflict, while showing that Chechnya was a zone of instability.
The instability in Chechnya has played into the hands of the security services and of certain elements of the Russian armed forces. The Interior Ministry forces and the security services have received a new impulse for their development.
Their present interests lie not in bringing about a renewal of the war (in which they would once again be defeated), but in a constant state of tension in Russia's southern border regions.
Alongside the old military-industrial complex, a sort of "military-police complex" has now come into being. While the army has gone into decline, the various intelligence bodies and organs of control and repression have grown and multiplied.
Under the leadership of General Kulikov, the Russian "interior forces" have come to number more than 300,000 people. They now have their own intelligence service, aviation and light tanks. According to experts, these are the most battle-ready military units in the country.
The military-repressive complex has been forcing the military-industrial complex onto the sidelines. The question of creating "mobile forces" has been under discussion for a long time now, but the forces have not yet been created. The reason is that the question has not yet been decided which enemies — external or internal — these forces will be aimed against.
A recent decision to cut back the independent structure of the army's airborne units is proof that the mobile forces will ultimately be set up as a police force for putting down revolts and carrying out reprisals against separatists.
Nationalisation
Unlike other leading figures who merely hint at having programs for dealing with Russia's crisis, Kulikov really does have a program. It is very simple, and would undoubtedly work.
About a year ago the general suggested carrying out sweeping nationalisations of enterprises whose owners were not fulfilling their duties to society: both tax-dodging enterprises and large commercial banks that were growing rich by siphoning off state funds.
Kulikov's position has grown stronger as the question of nationalisation has drawn increasing attention. With huge numbers of property owners becoming insolvent, with chronic non-payment of taxes and with the general dependency of enterprises on the state, selective nationalisation seems inevitable.
If the Communists start talking about nationalisation, the whole world will tremble. But if the same measures are carried out by a "democratic" general, who has conscientiously served an anticommunist regime, the world will sigh with relief. Russian entrepreneurs will not object either, except of course for those who fall directly beneath the wheels of nationalisation.
After the "epoch of reforms", the epoch of "imposing order" will soon be upon us. The way the proprietors of the new Russia have handled their looted assets guarantees that this property will not be considered sacred.
But if the Duma Communists sense a kinship between their positions and those of Kulikov, and hope to find an ally in him, they are profoundly mistaken. Precisely because the general's practical suggestions are very like the ideas of the left, any attempt to put these economic policies into practice will be accompanied in the best of cases by harsh anticommunist rhetoric, and at worst by direct repression of "subversive elements".
The epoch of imposing order requires a big cop, and it is obvious who is capable of playing this role. What remains unknown is how far the general's ambitions extend. It may be that he will restrict himself to the role of king-maker, or he may acquire a taste for power.