By Adam Hanieh
RAMALLAH — In recent years, the Islamic movement in Palestine, represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, has become the most prominent target of the Israeli government and imperialist leaders worldwide.
Responsibility for suicide bombings and militant speeches against Israel have led to illegal mass arrests of activists and calls by the Israeli government to "dismantle the terrorist infrastructure" in the areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority.
However, Israel has not always discouraged the rise of the Islamic movement. In 1986, the Israeli military governor of Gaza, General Segev, stated, "We extend some financial aid to Islamic groups via mosques and religious schools in order to help create a force that would stand against the leftist forces that support the PLO".
Up until 1989, when the Israeli Defence Force declared Hamas illegal, it had enjoyed tolerance and even encouragement. During the early days of the intifada, the Israeli army never interfered with Hamas strike days and the then Israeli defence minister, Yitzhak Rabin, held talks with prominent Islamic leaders.
Muslim Brotherhood
Hamas was launched publicly in February 1988 by the Muslim Brotherhood. A Palestinian wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood appeared during the 1970s under the leadership of Sheik Ahmad Yasin.
The brotherhood was originally a cultural and religious force which aimed to establish the "Islamic personality" in the West Bank and Gaza. It abstained from all anti-occupation activities, focusing instead on religion.
Heavily funded from Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood could claim in 1986 that it controlled 40% of Gaza's mosques and the largest university in the West Bank and Gaza.
However, confronted by the mass struggles of the intifada, the brotherhood was faced with the possibility of losing its influence due to the rising nationalist consciousness. It responded by forming Hamas, which, for the first time, linked nationalism to religious duty.
Hamas was characterised by a mix of fervent nationalism and anti-Semitism, rejecting the PLO's acceptance of a two-state solution in 1988 and accusing Jews of responsibility for World War II and the formation of the League of Nations.
By the end of the intifada, Hamas was polling second to Fatah in elections to student and professional bodies. However, the negotiations that followed the 1991 Gulf War significantly altered its relationship with the PLO.
Unlike any of the leftist factions of the PLO, Hamas took an unequivocal stand against the negotiations and mounted several well-supported actions against the Madrid Conference, including shutting down Gaza with a three-day strike.
Nationalist mantle
In December 1992, Hamas resumed full-scale military operations against Israel by killing six Israeli soldiers in one week. Israel responded by expelling 415 alleged Islamists to the hills of south Lebanon.
It then became clear that Hamas' aim of winning the nationalist mantle from the PLO was having some success; one poll indicated that more than 10% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 16% of Gazans considered the Islamic movement their representative instead of the PLO.
In the years following Oslo, Hamas combined a series of military operations with tactical manoeuvres with the Palestinian Authority and leftist factions.
In 1994 it allied with the Popular and Democratic Fronts to form the Damascus-based Palestinian Forces Alliance, an anti-Oslo coalition of 10 opposition groups. In 1993, Hamas participated with these opposition groups in the Birzeit University student elections and defeated the pro-Oslo ticket.
The first signs of tensions within Hamas occurred with the elections of January 1994. Hamas leader Sheik Yasin supported participation because it would "reassert the strength of the Islamist presence". But many others argued that participation would legitimise Oslo.
While Hamas did not, in the end, participate openly, several prominent Islamists close to the movement did stand and received considerable support.
Islamic Jihad was formed in the mid-'80s by a group of Shiite activists who supported the Iranian revolution. Its growth was initially encouraged by the PLO as a counterweight to the Muslim Brotherhood.
It received financial and political support from Abu Jihad, an important PLO leader at the time who had been a member of the brotherhood before his rise to a senior leader in Fatah.
Islamic Jihad operates much more secretively than Hamas. Although a significantly smaller organisation, it is strongly disciplined, its members organised in cells. Apart from official spokespeople and public leaders, its members often do not know each other. Jihad members will work on prospective recruits for years before revealing their membership.
Despite their avowedly different religious backgrounds, Islamic Jihad and the military wing of Hamas coordinate their activities.
Widening gap
This is part of a significant trend in the Islamic movement today: a growing tension between radical politics and conservative social policies which is causing a widening gap between the organisations' leaders and activist base.
One activist, close to both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, told Green Left: "The leadership of Hamas is moving back to the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood and is more concerned with implementing its social views than fighting the occupation.
"However, most young activists have not relinquished their nationalist politics. There is an increasing schism between the military wing and the political leadership. The 'official' leadership does not control the military actions."
At its heart, this conflict stems from the widening social gap which has developed since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the self-rule areas. A small layer, concentrated in the leadership of some political parties, the NGO movement and the Palestinian bourgeoisie, have gained considerable benefits from Oslo, including comparative social stability and economic opportunities not available to most Palestinians.