Behind the NSW rail crisis

November 17, 1993
Issue 

Peter Perkins, Sydney

How did one of the best metropolitan passenger rail networks in the world get thrown into chaos this month leaving angry commuters stranded on overcrowded platforms, unsure of how they were going to get home or to work?

With privatisation in mind, in 1996 Labor Premier Bob Carr's government amended the Transport Administration Act 1988 to break the State Rail Authority into the Rail Infrastructure Corporation, the Freight Rail Corporation, the Railway Services Authority and the SRA. The RIC looked after rail infrastructure maintenance and new technology maintenance, such as phones and computers.

This break-up of the railways administration did not lead to more efficient control of the system. Rather, it increased its complexity and hindered communication between what in reality was a deeply interconnected system. One corporation or authority could not act without affecting the other, often deleteriously.

Reliability of train services did not effect RIC, even though whatever RIC did, determined whether infrastructure would fail and delay trains. Costs also blew out as each of the new bodies built their bureaucratic empires and staunchly defended their turf.

Beginning in 1997, many maintenance projects, such as those on the East Hills, Illawarra and South Coast lines, were contracted to private operators. Many skilled tradespeople and maintenance workers from the SRA were either forced into accepting redundancy or re-hired under new awards by the private maintenance corporations, which were handed billions of dollars by the government. The government effectively reduced spending on rail infrastructure, reducing the budget by 30% ($72.1 million) in one year (2000).

In October 2000, a Tangara passenger train derailed near Kingsgrove station, rolled onto its side and injured several passengers. The investigation into the accident, which concluded the following year, found that infrastructure maintenance had been totally inadequate. Bolts and spikes were missing over several sections of line, track geometry had been progressively degraded and twisted, and rail welds hadn't been completed satisfactorily.

The RIC and the government carried most of the blame for the failure and the unsafe nature of the maintenance work that had been undertaken by the private maintenance contractor. The report into the incident highlighted a flawed tendering process and lack of detail on the standards and procedures that were to be followed.

The February 2003 Waterfall derailment, in which seven commuters were killed and another 40 badly injured, focused attention once again on aspects of safety.

The final report into the Waterfall disaster let rail management off the hook, reducing the blame to "human factors" since it was assumed the driver of the train had suffered a heart attack just before the accident. The subsequent autopsy of the dead driver was inconclusive on this issue.

On January 1, RailCorp was formed from the amalgamation of the RIC and SRA. Alongside the amalgamation, stringent new medical tests for drivers have been introduced. These are aimed at reducing accident risk by getting rid of the older workers and those who are overweight or have health problems, rather than investing in upgrading infrastructure.

The Sleep Research Centre at Adelaide University some time ago discovered that the life expectancy of train drivers after retirement was around five years compared to a national average that was more than double that.

Long years of sleep deprivation took its toll on drivers, increasing the risk of circulatory problems, diabetes, obesity, drug and alcohol abuse, digestive problems, mental illness and other ailments.

Sleep deprivation, combined with the eating of take-away foods high in sugar and fats, because of lack of time, makes for an unhealthy outcome.

In the first week of February, several train crews were stood down from their normal jobs after failing the discriminatory medical examinations, despite a critical train driver shortage. The government and RailCorp knew nearly two years earlier that a critical driver shortage existed, yet did not take the necessary steps to boost driver numbers.

Many drivers had been working long hours since the 2000 Olympics just to keep the system operational; there had been many delays and cuts to services already to cover the deficiencies. When the system is overstrained, many drivers go without meal breaks, and delays in the system cause them to work even longer hours.

Drivers are also being blamed for troubles on the network and are being punished for the long hours of work by having to undergo medical tests which remove a further 10 drivers a day from the network.

Drivers had raised these issues with the Rail, Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) leadership repeatedly but failed to receive an adequate response.

Infrastructure failures are also increasing drivers' working time and workload. Drivers are questioning themselves over these "quality of life issues", since many do not get to spend time with their families on weekends or during the week.

The drivers' grievances came to a head on February 5 when a group of them began refusing to work overtime and institued a work-to-rule campaign. This simple act threw the rail network into chaos.

Transport minister Michael Costa and the RailCorp CEO Vince Graham began to blame the drivers for all the woes of the rail system, calling them "wreckers". However, newspaper opinion polls indicted most of the public blamed the Carr government, rather than the drivers, for the crisis.

As a result, the government began negotiating a deal with RTBU officials. On February 12, RTBU NSW branch secretary Nick Lewocki, Costa and Graham jointly announced that they had brokered a deal giving the drivers bonus payments for each day of overtime, up a maximum of $400 for four days' extra work per month (up to $5000 per annum).

Lewocki had reduced the drivers' grievances to the issues of overtime payments and staff amenities, which showed a complete lack of understanding of the realities the drivers face in their day-to-day work. It remains to be seen whether Lewocki can sell the deal to the drivers.

From Green Left Weekly, February 18, 2004.
Visit the Green Left Weekly home page.

You need Green Left, and we need you!

Green Left is funded by contributions from readers and supporters. Help us reach our funding target.

Make a One-off Donation or choose from one of our Monthly Donation options.

Become a supporter to get the digital edition for $5 per month or the print edition for $10 per month. One-time payment options are available.

You can also call 1800 634 206 to make a donation or to become a supporter. Thank you.