The Workers Party and the Brazilian elections

September 28, 1994
Issue 

By Mario Marcio Freitas-Nantes

In the 25 years following the military coup of 1964, the Brazilian population was progressively marginalised from the decision making that governs Brazilian political and economic life. This was achieved through the cooption of working class organisations, the infiltration of popular social movements and professional organisations and removing the right to vote.

The authoritarian government constructed a corrupt, nepotistic federal and state bureaucracy which even now, in a nascent democratic system, continues to reinforce the power and interests of a privileged few. As we say in Brazil: one can change the mask, but the face remains the same.

The Workers Party (PT), formed in 1979, rose from the fire of political conflict and popular mobilisation which characterised the '70s and captured the imagination of the politically dispossessed. In 1980, the party gained recognition when the registration of political parties was legalised for the first time in 15 years.

The PT was created from below by trade unionists, political militants from a wide range of left-wing organisations, popular social movements and the Catholic Church. Its founding members included academics, lawyers, economists and prominent figures from the arts and entertainment industry.

In the 10 years that followed, the PT became the principal focus of grassroots opposition to the military regime, mobilising hundreds of thousands nationwide. Its significance was such that it became one of the most repressed political organisations in the country. The PT's most significant achievement was its initiation of the pro-democracy movement which led millions of ordinary Brazilians onto the streets in support of political change.

Electoral success was much less dynamic, but slowly the party began to increase its representation. In 1986, PT leader Lula gained the highest number of votes cast nationally for any candidate for federal deputy. In the years that followed the party gained control of many important municipal governments, the most significant being that of the city of Sao Paulo.

By 1989, the PT had a real chance of winning the first free election for a Brazilian president in 25 years. However, in this election the PT gained some insight into the problems it faced in challenging the traditional oligarchy and the powerful beneficiaries of the authoritarian political system. For instance, the family of Lula's principal adversary, Fernando Collor, used its influence within the media to considerable effect in undermining the PT's campaign.

With far less financial support than the other candidates, Lula relied on the political commitment and ingenuity of the grassroots of the party. In spite of overwhelming odds, the elections went to a second ballot which Lula lost by a mere 4%.

The presidential election to be held in early October pits Lula against the internationally famous sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso, an ex-Marxist, has concentrated on building a political career which has led him to reject the political ideas that made him famous. Last year he was promoted to minister of finance in the present government of Itamar Franco; there he set about constructing a new economic package — allegedly formulated in Washington — which was supposed to resolve the long-running Brazilian economic crisis once and for all.

The indexing of prices and wages to the US dollar, the creation of a new currency, the "real", and the development of an ambitious economic package called the "Real Plan", became the linchpin of Cardoso's campaign.

The Brazilian economic crisis has left millions unemployed and some 64 million living below the poverty line. In previous years inflation exceeded 2000% annually and pessimistic predictions at the beginning of this year were that inflation would peak at 5000%. The Real Plan led to a dramatic drop in the monthly inflation rate from 50% to 2% within the first month. This figure is now around 5-6%.

The apparent early success of the plan led to a radical swing in electoral support for Cardoso, from 8% to 30%. Lula had, for over a year, led the polls with over 40%, yet within three months of the inauguration of the plan was trailing his adversary by some 23%.

Every new announcement by the government gave a further boost to Cardoso's campaign. Once again the PT found itself struggling against the weight of media manipulation and its own lack of finances.

There were other factors which exacerbated the effect of the Real Plan on the campaign. Cardoso's election manifesto bore more than a passing resemblance to the PT's, launched over a year before. Cardoso's promise of greater support for housing, education and health, and his use of populist rhetoric, left little room for the PT to underline the differences in the two documents.

Lula and the other presidential candidates began to complain about the illegal use of federal government resources in support of Cardoso. They asked the Supreme Electoral Commission to investigate the Cardoso campaign and disqualify him over these illegalities.

Political scandal

Rubens Ricupero, the finance minister in charge of Cardoso's economic package, engaging in a pre-interview chat with a television presenter which inadvertently went to air, revealed that the government was manipulating both the Real Plan and statistical data to give maximum favourable media coverage. He made it clear that the government would hold back inflation and any unpopular economic measures until after the election.

Ricupero was forced to resign. Despite the swift appointment of a popular Ciro Gomes as his replacement, the damage had already been done and the gap between Cardoso and Lula narrowed to 17%, with 11% uncommitted.

Other events have also eroded support for Cardoso. The government has refused to implement industrial agreements made last year which tied salaries to inflation. This prompted a general strike involving some 75,000 workers from the metal and car industries, and has created an explosive political situation.

Discontent also extends to major industrialists, who have been badly hit by the freeing up of import restrictions on foreign goods. The Finance Ministry has threatened to remove all import restrictions and taxes on foreign cars and machinery if the major manufacturers comply with the wage agreements they made with their workers last year.

The PT had asked the main trade union federations to defer any strike action until after the elections, arguing that it might have an adverse effect on Lula's campaign. It would seem that the government's intervention in the wage negotiations was aimed at provoking strike action in the hope of damaging Lula. However, industrialists have been an important source of financial and political support for Cardoso, and there are signs that this support has been severely damaged by recent events.

Cardoso's main support comes from right-wing organisations and political parties. All the principal figures involved in his campaign have played an integral role in previous military governments and anti-democratic political factions. This has now become a major bone of contention among centre-left and liberal forces within the ranks of Cardoso's alliance.

The corruption scandals and the Ricupero incident have left many supporters arguing that they can no longer support Cardoso's campaign. Their support and votes will not necessarily go to Lula but probably will go to other opposition candidates, denying Cardoso the victory he wants in the first ballot.

Confidential sources concede that the Real Plan is already beginning to flounder and the government will not be able to continue to sustain the plan in its present form beyond early October — the moment of the first ballot.

Present levels of inflation are already under threat as basic food prices rise and salary increases fail to compensate workers for the erosion of their salaries over the last 12 months. The honeymoon period of the Real Plan is already coming to an end.

Spontaneous demonstrations in Brasilia and Sao Paulo against political corruption bring to mind the downfall of President Collor, brought about by such mass actions.

A victory for the PT this year would give a clear sign to Latin Americans that the political winds of change can be converted from a breeze to a hurricane in a continent that has lived for far too long in the shadow of repressive political regimes, civil war, economic crisis and impoverishment.

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