US preparations to invade Haiti have been explained in terms of forcing out the military dictators who seized power there three years ago. But something closer to the truth began to surface on September 15, when deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott told reporters that the invasion would go ahead even if the military leaders went into exile before it occurred, and that US forces would remain as occupiers for "months". NEVILLE SPENCER looks at the US government's real concerns.
The US has invaded Haiti on two previous occasions. In 1914, following disputes over the repayment of Haiti's debt to the US, marines landed and raided the National Bank, taking the nation's gold reserves back to New York with them.
The second invasion followed in 1915. The invasion force occupied the country for 19 years and established the basis of Haiti's current political and economic systems. Haiti's army was disbanded and a new army formed under US officers. The constitution was rewritten to allow foreign ownership of property.
US exports to Haiti rose from US$3.8 million in 1915 to US$15 million by 1918. The nation's finances came under US control; even after the withdrawal of troops in 1934, the National Bank remained a subsidiary of the US Export-Import Bank.
Francois Duvalier became president in 1957 and established a dictatorship which, with continued support from the US, lasted until 1986, his son Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeding him in 1971. The Duvaliers amassed a fortune of hundreds of millions of dollars. Estimates are that up to 50,000 people were killed by the regime.
Jean-Claude Duvalier fled waves of protests and clashes with security forces in a plane provided by the US in 1986. A series of unstable regimes followed, culminating in Haiti's first relatively fraud-free elections in December 1990, when liberation theologist Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide won a landslide victory.
Big spenders
The US had poured money into the campaign of a former World Bank economist Marc Bazin, who nevertheless ran a distant second. Bazin wanted to expand export industries and encourage foreign investment. This appealed to US capitalists, for whom Haiti had become an ideal place to locate assembly plants. Workers there would typically earn around US$11 for a 45-hour week.
US money was also spent to weaken unions and the popular movements. Via the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States Agency for International Development, millions were allocated for so-called democracy enhancement.
Through the NED, the two more conservative of Haiti's three union federations received funding. USAID opposed a minimum wage increase to 50 cents per hour with the argument that it could "lead to capital-intensive, rather than labour-intensive responses to opening of markets".
In 1986, the CIA set up the Haitian National Intelligence Service (NIS), supposedly to gather intelligence on narcotic trafficking. The New York Times, however, quoted a US embassy official that the organisation "never produced drug intelligence".
Patrick Elie, a drug policy adviser to the Aristide government, said that the CIA training provided to NIS agents included training for "wet operations" — CIA jargon for political assassinations.
Last November, the New York Times revealed that many of the leaders of the coup against Aristide had been on CIA payrolls at least up until 1991.
Aristide in the 1990 elections stood as the candidate of the National Front for Change and Democracy. It represented mostly the merchant bourgeoisie, who were opposed to a Duvalier-style regime. They were also opposed to being squeezed by foreign capital.
Their electoral prospects seemed dim until Aristide agreed to stand. Aristide brought with him support from the popular movements — peasant organisations, unions, neighbourhood organisations and the progressive church, Ti Legliz, giving the party a much more radical, anti-imperialist constituency. This broad coalition of forces became known as Lavalas.
In spite of its distaste for the Aristide government, the US spoke out clearly in opposition to the coup. But many less trumpeted statements by US officials have been cautious in their defence of Aristide and even outright hostile to him.
Within a few days of the coup, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said, "We don't know [if Aristide will return to power] in the sense that the government in his country is changing and considering any number of different possibilities". Fitzwater claimed that Aristide had relied on "mob rule".
US officials began circulating a notebook detailing alleged human rights abuses of the Aristide government. The notebook had been produced by Jean-Jacque Honorat, from an organisation funded by the NED. Soon after, Honorat was appointed prime minister by the military.
Another document, released by the CIA in 1993, claimed that Aristide was mentally unstable and had been treated for manic depressive syndrome in the early '80s. Officials later admitted that it was probably a forgery.
A secret document leaked by a security guard — assassinated several days later — at the US embassy in Haiti shed further light on US strategy. It said: "The United States would agree to recognise a new prime minister and unblock the Haitian government assets in the United States ... If Aristide comes back, it could not be earlier than a few months from now ... and only so that he can be sent back destitute, into exile shortly thereafter ... The prime minister will become the real power ... what is needed presently is a broad, sustained, and very discreet approach from US policymakers and the media which will counteract and nullify the propaganda of the Lavalas organisation."
Embargo
The first version of economic embargo against the regime was drafted by the Organisation of American States on October 2, two days after the coup. The UN General Assembly unanimously supported the OAS-sponsored resolution on October 11. It was not until November 5 that President Bush issued a decree for the US to comply with the embargo.
The embargo was never enforced. Oil and other goods continued to be shipped into Haiti from the US and a host of other countries. Trade through the neighbouring Dominican Republic increased to make up for any difficulties caused by the embargo.
The embargo was further weakened after complaints from US businesses in Haiti. On February 4, 1992, the State Department announced the "fine-tuning" of the embargo, allowing shipments of goods destined for assembly plants.
In spite of initial statements that they would not negotiate with the regime, the US and UN organised negotiations and pressured Aristide to make concessions.
After visiting Haiti and meeting mostly with pro-coup politicians, an OAS delegation persuaded Aristide to meet with some of these politicians in Colombia. They presented an agreement supported by the US in which the embargo would be lifted in exchange only for continued negotiations. Aristide refused to sign and was consequently accused of intransigence by US officials.
After further talks with the pro-coup politicians, US and OAS negotiators persuaded Aristide to get rid of his prime minister and appoint a new one. They rejected Aristide's suggestions for possible replacements and offered him a choice of Marc Bazin or Rene Theodore, head of the Communist Party — only nominally left-wing and a fierce opponent of Aristide. Aristide accepted Theodore.
Aristide was also pushed into signing a "protocol of accord" which agreed to an amnesty for coup leaders and that legislation passed since the coup should remain. It stated that the embargo would be lifted as soon as the new prime minister was ratified. While it recognised Aristide as president, it contained no agreement as to when he might return. The agreement soon collapsed as the military began to stress that Aristide's return was not a part of the deal and Aristide backed away from the concessions he had made.
Governor's Island Accord
On June 16, 1993, the UN Security Council supported a resolution for strengthening and enforcing sanctions. This was followed by negotiations which produced the Governor's Island Accord on July 3. Coup leaders were to be granted an amnesty, Cedras was to retire, and police chief Francois was to be replaced. Aristide was to return to Haiti by October 30, and an international military contingent would help on construction projects and professionalise the military. Sanctions were to be lifted immediately.
Aristide was reluctant to sign. Reportedly, UN envoy Dante Caputo threatened to lift sanctions immediately if he did not. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told him, "Just sign it."
The US ship which arrived with the first contingent of UN troops left without landing when it was met by a demonstration of 200 paramilitary thugs.
The assassination of the Haitian justice minister a few days later and the refusal of Cedras and Francois to leave their positions killed off the accord. Sanctions were reimposed, but the accord had given the military time to stockpile extra supplies.
Aristide has pointed out that the sanctions were prepared with the intention of failing. Leaving the military intact while reducing the power of Aristide and Lavalas has consistently been the US aim.