By Max Lane
On November 12, thousands of East Timorese and their supporters around the world will be demonstrating in commemoration of the massacre of peaceful protesters in Dili in 1991. Around the world, people will be demanding that Indonesia get out of East Timor, that the East Timorese people be able to determine their own future. In Australia, many people will be making demands not only on the Indonesian regime, but also on their own government, because it has actively assisted the Suharto dictatorship's occupation of East Timor.
Before the invasion in 1975, the Whitlam ALP government embarked on a policy of supporting, if not encouraging, Suharto's plans. It is common knowledge today that the Australian Army's defence signals unit was picking up Indonesian army communications prior to the invasion, but the Australian government did nothing to stop it. Throughout this period, any form of official, or even semi-official, recognition of the East Timorese nationalist forces or any declaration supporting the concept of an independent East Timor would have forced Suharto to rethink the invasion.
The ALP government of the time, however, made it clear that it did not think that "small nations" were viable.
The Fraser Liberal government which followed Whitlam pursued the same policy: recognition of the invasion and annexation as a so-called accomplished fact. During the whole of the Fraser period, and into the first few years of the Hawke ALP government, Australia also continued to provide military support and assistance to Indonesia. In fact, this assistance increased after 1975, despite the fact that the East Timorese were engaged in armed resistance to the occupying Indonesian army.
Australia joined the United States and the United Kingdom in supplying Indonesia with the military equipment it needed to suppress the East Timorese resistance.
Fakery
During its time in opposition, the ALP attempted to present a more critical position. The invasion had provoked extensive hostile public opinion against Indonesia and a relatively strong solidarity movement had developed in Australia. Demonstrations and publicity campaigns were frequent and gained very positive responses. Military aid to Indonesia was very unpopular.
Activists in the left of the ALP became involved in the campaign and took the East Timorese solidarity movement's demands into the ALP. ALP conferences started to adopt quite severe-sounding resolutions against the Indonesian occupation.
However, the ALP's real policy was revealed when Labor won government in the 1983 elections. Bob Hawke's first overseas state visit was to Jakarta. There he made his famous champagne toast to Suharto: "We know your people love you".
All the severe-sounding ALP conference resolutions went out the window. Australia also went from recognising the annexation de facto to recognising it as legally valid. Australia is one of only two countries that have given this recognition.
The ALP has acted more and more as an active campaigner and supporter of Indonesia on the East Timor issue, and on human rights issues.
After a brief period when Jakarta, offended by Australian newspaper exposure of the corruption of Suharto's family, suspended cooperation, military assistance was stepped up. Although Australia no longer provides equipment aid to Jakarta, training and joint military exercises have increased. Since 1992 there have regular visits to Australia of KOPASSUS troops, precisely those commando forces used in operations against the East Timorese resistance.
This year, defence minister Robert Ray has taken things a step further and suggested joint manufacture of small arms with Jakarta. He also invited Suharto to send forces to Australia to participate in the Kangaroo 95 war games.
Foreign minister Gareth Evans has become a central figure campaigning in defence of the Indonesian position. Again and again, Evans states that the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia is "irrevocable".
For Evans, and his big business backers, such as BHP, the annexation must remain "irrevocable". To admit otherwise would throw into grave doubt Australian big business's claim to the East Timorese people's oil.
New tricks
The ALP government's campaign received a big blow with the November 1991 Dili protests and the massacre that followed. These events provoked an awakening of public opinion outside Indonesia, including in Australia. Solidarity committees in Australia and in Europe and North America, became active again. East Timorese exile communities began reorganising and increased their activities.
Furthermore, since November 1991, there have been more demonstrations in Dili during the visit of foreign journalist delegations. The East Timorese resistance has been able to speak directly with the outside world through such films as Death of a Nation and through a series of smuggled video recordings and cassettes.
The increase in public campaigning has forced Evans and the ALP to develop a new twist to their argument. The Australian government, Evans now claims, is pressing the Indonesian government to find "strategies of reconciliation" between Indonesia and the East Timorese people and the resistance. This reconciliation is not to be based on recognition of the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination but on things such as "reduction in military presence", "economic development", "recognition of distinctive cultural identity of the East Timorese", and "possibly", adds Evans, in a letter responding to a citizen's inquiry, "some greater degree of autonomy".
This new twist is also reflected in the mealy-mouthed resolutions passed by the ALP conference this year. Following negotiations with Evans, the ALP left was allowed to put up a motion which went through the rituals of deploring what had happened in the past, uttering "concerns" about human rights and expressing vague hopes about a solution through current UN or other talks. But nowhere is there a call for recognition of the right of the East Timorese to self-determination, nowhere is there a demand for Indonesian withdrawal.
The right of the East Timorese people to determine their own future cannot be negotiated away in return for such non-concessions as two battalions of occupation troops instead of five, or classes on East Timorese culture in primary schools.
Furthermore, any autonomy under a dictatorship such as that of Suharto will be autonomy without freedom. There is no freedom of speech, press, assembly or organisation in any province of Indonesia, including those that have some kind of special status.
"Reconciliation" must be on the agenda in the future. But this reconciliation must be between free and independent neighbours. The November 12 protests around Australia should mark the start of a renewed campaign here to force the Australian government to implement a policy that will genuinely help such reconciliation.
Such a policy must be based on withdrawal of recognition of the annexation of East Timor, recognition of the resistance organisations as the legitimate representatives of the East Timorese people and an end to all defence cooperation with Indonesia.
[Max Lane is a member of the national executive of the Democratic Socialist Party.]