Far right stymied in Nicaragua

January 27, 1993
Issue 

By Neville Spencer

The defeat of the Sandinista government by the US-backed UNO coalition in the 1990 elections has left Nicaragua in a very unusual situation. The former government continues to play a large role in political life, and remains very influential in the army and police force.

The incoming government, led by Violeta Chamorro, has not been strong enough to undermine the deep support in the population for many policies of the Sandinistas. This has made it hard to implement the program demanded by the US government and the Nicaraguan extreme right, mainly made up of former exiles. Many of these took out US citizenship after fleeing to avoid trial for crimes committed under the corrupt dictatorship of Anatasio Somoza.

Withholding aid is the main form of US pressure on the Chamorro government. Far-right US senator Jesse Helms has been a major supporter of an aid cut-off, demanding the return of property seized under the Sandinistas from US citizens and companies. This would mean restoration of property to former Somoza cronies and a consequent return to the social conditions which led to the 1979 revolution.

Helms and his supporters are also anxious to drive the Sandinistas out of the army and police force. The Nicaraguan army, with its present composition, cannot be relied upon to violate the constitution in the service of the rich in the way most other Latin American armies do.

In addition, a major assault on the opposition appears necessary if the crumbling UNO is to win the next elections. The shaky coalition won much of its support in 1990 due to war weariness. This factor will be absent at the next poll, and the government will face growing unrest due to a deteriorating economic situation.

While UNO has brought inflation under control, more than 50% of Nicaraguans are unemployed or under-employed in the populous Pacific provinces, and the figure is around 90% on the sparsely populated Atlantic coast.

There is little prospect of the government buying the next election. This makes its absence of military clout an increasingly pressing problem for the far right.

President Chamorro, a prominent anti-Somoza liberal from a wealthy family in pre-Sandinista days, does not favour the military option and has not been as pliable as the US government and its allies hoped at the time of her election.

Nonetheless, she has made concessions to US and right-wing pressure, exchanging a tiny amount of aid for the abandonment of any claim for the US$17 billion awarded against the US by the World Court as reparations for the Contra war. As well, on September 5 she sacked the chief of the National Police, Rene Vivas, though he was replaced by

Managua mayor Arnold Aleman, one of the three main leaders of the ultraright, has already attempted to create a parallel police force. Suspicions were aroused when the city set up a corps of park inspectors and local tax collectors complete with military-style uniforms, swearing-in ceremony and a requirement that they salute their superiors. The force was disbanded after the Supreme Court ruled that it encroached unconstitutionally on the role of the police.

The main focus of conflict between the right and the FSLN is a transition protocol drawn up between Chamorro and the FSLN prior to the handover of power. This protects property rights established under the outgoing government, including FSLN property and land distributed as part of the agrarian reform.

The protocol also guarantees the structure and command of the army, including the position of General Humberto Ortega as supreme commander. Ortega retained the post on condition that he resign from the FSLN.

In the absence of any similar agreement regarding the police, there have been a few incidents. Some workers' occupations of factories have been broken up, and on one occasion police fired on a demonstration in Matagalpa, though there were no casualties. That incident was caused by one officer, and relations between unions and the police have improved since that time.

Relations between the army and the FSLN also have not been entirely free of friction. General Ortega caused a lot of controversy by awarding a medal to US Lieutenant Colonel David Quinn, an adviser to the Contras. FSLN supporters were also disturbed by the arrest in January 1991 of four high-ranking army officers on charges of stealing 28 surface-to-air missiles and supplying them to the FMLN guerillas in El Salvador.

Despite such tensions the opposition has prevented the US-backed forces from turning back the clock to 1978, and the workers and peasants remain in a strong position to fight for their rights.

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