The end of the Khmer Rouge?

July 2, 1997
Issue 

Since 1987, Dr HELEN JARVIS has visited Cambodia regularly and worked there for extended periods in 1991, 1992-93 and 1995. She has worked with the National Library of Cambodia in its rebuilding after the Pol Pot years and in training of librarians. Since 1995 she has been a consultant on documentation for the Cambodia Genocide Program, which is compiling evidence from the 1975-78 period for possible use in any trial of Khmer Rouge leaders. She was interviewed for Green Left Weekly by ALLEN MYERS.

Question: As we speak, it is still not known for certain whether Pol Pot has been captured alive and will be handed over to the government in Phnom Penh, but it is clear that the movement he headed has crumbled. What is the significance of this?

It is almost 20 years since Pol Pot's regime was overthrown, but throughout that period he continued to pose a mortal threat to Cambodia. The final collapse of his power base would bring a psychological relief to those he has terrorised for so long.

Question: Can we now way that there is no longer a threat of the Khmer Rouge returning to power?

Sadly, one cannot give a positive response. It's clear that deals are being done — Pol Pot himself may be traded off by other senior members of the Khmer Rouge to buy their way into the government.

It is publicly acknowledged by the first prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh, that negotiations were being conducted with the Khmer Rouge headquarters at Anlong Veng. We don't know what was promised to the KR leaders to get them to turn on Pol Pot.

Question: There are apparent conflicts in the government over dealing with Khieu Samphan, who was the nominal leader of the KR after Pol Pot supposedly "retired" in the late 1980s. What is behind this?

Both parties in the coalition government are seeking to gain an advantage over the other, politically, militarily and economically. It seems that FUNCINPEC is promoting the notion of Khieu Samphan as the good guy and proposing that he be invited to join the government.

On the other hand, Hun Sen has been recalling the popular outrage directed at Khieu Samphan when he returned to Phnom Penh in November 1991 and had to flee the city after a few hours to escape popular vengeance.

Question: Why is there such conflict within the coalition?

The government was never really a coalition, but rather a temporary compromise between two antagonists.

The CPP had been in power since overthrowing Pol Pot, with Vietnamese assistance, in 1979.

FUNCINPEC was allied with the Khmer Rouge, fighting from the border camps in an effort to depose the CPP. The Paris agreement — in which Gareth Evans had a hand — called for disarmament of all sides and a UN-supervised election.

Although it signed the agreement, the KR never carried out a single one of its provisions. Its allies, mainly FUNCINPEC, left their territories to the KR and came to the capital to fight the election.

The UN was able to operate only in CPP-held territory and did so in a manner that undermined the authority of the CPP government.

In the election, FUNCINPEC and its allies gained a majority of seats, campaigning strongly on their connection with the royal family and nostalgia for happier days.

But although it won the election, FUNCINPEC lacked a real political apparatus in most areas. The whole civil, police and military administration was closely linked to the CPP. In those circumstances, a coalition, brokered by King Sihanouk, seemed the only way out of an impasse.

Question: What was the meaning earlier this year of the defection to the government by Ieng Sary?

Ieng Sary's defection showed that the KR was on its last legs militarily. Ieng Sary was foreign minister in the KR regime, and in 1979 he and Pol Pot were the only KR leaders tried in absentia and condemned to death by the CPP government.

Since the law to outlaw the KR in July 1994, thousands of KR soldiers had surrendered and been amnestied by the government. But Ieng Sary was the first top-ranking leader to defect.

This deprived the KR of their territory around the gem-mining town of Pailin, leaving them only Anlong Veng, where Pol Pot was in charge.

Ieng Sary set up a "movement" and proposed that he be considered a normal participant in the political process, and he endorsed a new "united front" set up by Ranariddh to compete against the CPP in the election to be held before May 1998.

At the same time, Ieng Sary has been left in military control of Pailin; his forces have not been integrated into the government army. This gives him an obvious leverage in political negotiations.

Question: How is the Cambodian situation influenced by international politics?

Cambodia has to be seen in the context of imperialism's "new world order". Washington, and Beijing, wanted to get rid of the CPP government in Cambodia. As in Nicaragua, the method chosen was elections in which outsiders could directly and indirectly affect the outcome.

The result was not so clear cut as in Nicaragua, but since 1993 — in fact, it began in 1991 — the state created in 1979 has been gradually dismantled and replaced by one much closer to the neo-colonial model.

Capital has poured in — but usually into socially undesirable "development" — while funds-starved government infrastructure has collapsed. Government workers and soldiers earn US$30 a month while mobile phones and expensive cars proliferate. These are ideal conditions for the flourishing of corruption.


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