By Allen Myers
John Smith is of course correct that there is room for supporters of Cuba to discuss and criticise policies of the revolutionary government if that seems appropriate, within the overall context of solidarity and opposition to the US blockade. His own argument is clearly written from that standpoint.
Naturally, freedom of criticism has to work both ways. Those of us who are not convinced by Smith's arguments have the right to criticise the criticism. And it should not be assumed that a disagreement with his analysis is the same as "consistently overlook[ing]" it.
One hopes, moreover, that Smith will deal with Cuban government policies more fairly than he does with Chow Wei Cheng's article. Chow's article reports on the signs that Cuba's economy is beginning to recover from blows it was dealt by the collapse of its trading partners and the tightening of the US blockade. There is nothing in Chow's article which justifies Smith's glib phrases about "a victory for Cuban socialism or socialists worldwide". The struggle against capitalist encirclement, and the US blockade in particular, is clearly a continuing one.
Smith, however, almost seems to argue that there is something illegitimate about examining objective evidence, such as economic statistics, in order to gain a better understanding of how that struggle is going.
Having suggested that economic statistics are illegitimate or irrelevant, Smith then turns around and demands the answer to questions which cannot be answered in full without statistics (statistics of course are not the full answer): "... what are the consequences of the reduced government deficit, etc etc ...?"
One can only repeat the information from Chow's article. Some of the consequences are an increase of real GDP of 0.7% in 1994, expected by international capitalist observers to rise to 3% in 1995 and 6-8% in 1996-7; considerable progress against inflation, reflected in the peso rising from 120 to the US dollar to 50 to the dollar in a period of nine months; an increase in the number of foreign joint ventures; a decline in some food prices and a contraction of the black market; a 58% increase in the social assistance budget.
Smith is 180 degrees off the mark when he ignores the answers to his own question and goes on to assert that "the 'real wage' of Cuban workers has fallen dramatically over the past few years as a direct result of [Cuban government] policy responses".
Yes, the real wage of Cuban workers has fallen dramatically. Smith began his article by pointing out, correctly, that this was due to the "devastating economic effects" of the eastern European collapse and the US blockade. A few paragraphs on, he seems to have forgotten this.
Moreover, Smith continues, the government's policies are making things worse. The fall in real wages is "compounded" by other reforms, such as the "consistent push for efficiency and productivity of state enterprises". What are we to make of this? Are inefficient and unproductive state enterprises means of producing higher real wages for Cuban workers? Is it really conceivable that Cuba, having suffered a decline in real income of 45%, can afford to subsidise loss-making enterprises?
Most of Smith's article consists of a recitation of economic setbacks which are undeniable and undenied by anyone. From these, however, he seems to be drawing only partially formulated conclusions which would not follow even if they were clearly expressed.
For example, he asks rhetorically, "... is it reactionary to ask just how many conquests of the revolution are to be saved?" No, not reactionary. But it's absurd to imply that the answer depends on arbitrary decisions or acts of will by the Cuban government. And it is absurdly pessimistic to imply that if a conquest is rolled back now, it is gone forever.
The Cuban revolutionaries are fighting to preserve as much as possible in very difficult circumstances. The outcome depends on struggle (including what is contributed by the international solidarity movement). All socialists will share Smith's disappointment at every backward step forced on the revolution. That is quite different, however, from Smith's implication that the Cuban leaders are taking backward steps which are not necessary.
Exploitation
To understand Cuba's struggle correctly, we need to put it in the context of world economy. This — and not some list of rules for what "should" or "shouldn't" be done in a post-capitalist country — is the framework for evaluating Cuban government policy.
Smith is mistaken when he writes that Cuban workers are now to be exploited by international capitalism, as though this were a totally new situation.
Even before the "special period", Cubans were exploited by international capital. This is not a criticism of the revolution or its leaders, but a statement of the realities of world economy — realities which Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders have frequently called attention to.
Exploitation is built into international trade; it occurs automatically whenever there is trade between underdeveloped countries, where labour productivity is lower, and the imperialist countries. On the world market, a Cuban product that embodies, say, eight or 10 hours of labour exchanges for a product from a developed country that represents perhaps only one hour of labour. (This is usually referred to in economic literature as the "terms of trade" problem.)
Socialist revolutions in underdeveloped countries can only partially counter this "automatic" exploitation. By establishing a monopoly of foreign trade, a revolutionary state can restrain some of the worst excesses of multinational corporations. The monopoly may also allow it to get a somewhat higher price on the world market for its own products, if these are not widely produced by other countries. But no country in the world, not even the largest, is self-sufficient; and revolutionary Cuba has to trade — has to be exploited — on the world market. The US blockade intensifies that exploitation.
Prior to the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, trade with these countries offered Cuba a further possibility of partially avoiding exploitation by the world market. Because they were not capitalist, these countries could and did trade with Cuba on terms which were much more equal than those that prevail in the capitalist market. Much of so-called Soviet "aid" to Cuba was in fact merely fairer trade.
The crisis created by the sudden loss of Soviet/eastern European trade thus amounts to an intensification of the exploitation of Cuban producers by international capitalism — an indirect exploitation based on differences in labour productivity.
This exploitation can be ended only by the destruction of imperialism — i.e., by socialist revolution in the developed countries. But it can be reduced by measures that narrow the gulf in labour productivity between Cuba and the imperialist countries.
Productivity
Labour productivity is affected by a whole range of factors, including the intensity of labour, the living conditions of the working people (healthy people work more productively than unhealthy ones), the morale of the labour force, the condition of the transport and communications infrastructure and the allocation of labour power to productive or unproductive activities. This last point suggests why it would not be a good idea for the Cubans to accept Smith's implied advice to keep workers employed at jobs where they make no real contribution to additional production.
But the major factor in labour productivity is the level of technological development (which generally corresponds to the level of accumulated investment funds).
The underdeveloped countries are technologically backward because they have been plundered (directly and indirectly) by the developed, imperialist countries. The quickest way to overcome their shortage of investment funds would be to reclaim the wealth that has been looted from them and is now in the hands of the big corporations. That method, however, requires a socialist revolution in the imperialist countries.
Until that happy event, Cuba, or any other revolution in an underdeveloped country, needs another source of funds for development. This can be only a deduction from consumption funds, i.e., from working people's living standards, or foreign investment. As we have noted, Cuban working people's living standards have already been savaged by the crisis, so the need for foreign investment is inescapable.
Capitalists, of course, do not invest because of a sense of justice or love of humanity. The only thing that matters to them is the prospect of profits. Thus, in order to reduce their future indirect exploitation by the capitalist world market, the Cuban workers must submit today to an increased direct exploitation by particular international capitalists. The situation is paradoxical and not at all pleasant for the Cubans, but it is the reality they face.
It would be possible to argue about how well the Cuban government is confronting this reality (for example, is it making the most of diplomatic leverage, is it negotiating the best possible deals, is it securing the best possible conditions for workers employed by foreign capital, how is it coping with the undesirable consequences of foreign capitalist investment?). But although Smith calls his article "a critique of some Cuban government policies", he does not address such questions; rather, he seems to object to the government confronting the reality at all.
Who pays?
Yes, the Cuban government is "selectively applying aspects of capitalism". This, incidentally, was also the intention of the Bolsheviks at the time of the Russian Revolution, before imperialist intervention and civil war forced them to nationalise most industry prematurely, so one should not regard it as a departure from traditional Marxist thinking.
But what about Smith's argument that socialists "have consistently rejected the view that such concepts, structures and practices are the only realistic option in our own context, instead vigorously affirming and defending the necessity and viability of a radical alternative"?
The answer, of course, is that the context is everything. Socialists in Australia reject appeals to the "national interest" because that is the interest of Australia's capitalist ruling class. To solve economic or social problems, we argue for measures that put the burden on the capitalists instead of on working people — "make the rich pay".
The Cuban working people have already expropriated the Cuban capitalists, as well as the imperialist corporations which were operating in Cuba in 1959. In the Cuban context — the class relations that exist in Cuba — "make the rich pay" would be a meaningless program, since there is no longer a capitalist class. In Cuba today, working people are necessarily the people who pay for overcoming hardships, because there is no-one else who could pay.
In conditions of shortage like those of the "special period", there is always potential for particular layers of the working people to try to escape hardship by pushing more of the burden on to other layers. US imperialism's intensification of the blockade is partly motivated by the hope of creating that sort of destructive dynamic within Cuban society.
Countering that threat requires both a high social level of political consciousness and the overcoming of extreme shortages as rapidly as possible. Smith offers no alternative course by which revolutionary Cuba might revive its economy, because there is no real alternative available. The fact that the Cuban revolutionary government is confronting the crisis realistically is a reason for optimism, not worry.