AFGHANISTAN

Sham assembly installs warlord coalition

BY NORM DIXON

The much-hyped loya jirga — or grand assembly — was supposed to be post-Taliban Afghanistan's first step towards the creation of a representative democratic government. However, even before the delegates had begun to gather in Kabul for the meeting's scheduled start on June 10, it was obvious that the loya jirga would be neither democratic nor representative.

It did not take long for delegates to realise that the main purpose of the stage-managed extravaganza was to formalise and legitimise the cynical ruling coalition between Afghanistan's most powerful warlords and the US-backed central regime of Hamid Karzai — all with Washington's blessing.

As far as the US rulers and the Karzai regime were concerned, the loya jirga would be a mere formality. The May 25 New York Times reported: “Karzai is expected to win an easy victory and lead the new government, Afghan officials and Western diplomats said… He is being strongly backed by the former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah … and he has solidified his ties with several powerful former leaders of the Northern Alliance [NA]… The king has kept his promise not to push for the restoration of the monarchy…

“Karzai's strength reflects the enormous influence of the country that is backing him — the United States. From warlords on the country's fringes to ministers jockeying for position in Kabul, many leaders see American money and military clout as the ultimate source of power here.”

Warlords return

Washington has acquiesced in the return of the warlords on the proviso that they pledge allegiance to Karzai's “interim” administration and cooperate militarily with US forces.

Post-Taliban Afghanistan is divided into three major cantons — the west is dominated by the forces of Ismail Khan, a Farsi-speaking Tajik warlord with strong ties to Iran; the north is mainly controlled by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the ethnic Uzbek leader of Junbish-i-Milli; and central Afghanistan, including the capital Kabul, is the turf of the mainly ethnic Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami commanders from the Panjshir Valley, the most prominent being defence minister Mohammad Fahim.

The Panjshiri faction, Washington's main military ally in the toppling of the Taliban regime, was given a central role in the interim administration that was cobbled together in Bonn six months ago, being given the key ministries of defence, the interior (which runs the police) and foreign affairs.

However, in Afghanistan's south and east, no single warlord is paramount. The Pashtun ethnic majority in these areas — now politically marginalised because it was a base for the Taliban — is hostile to the NA-dominated Karzai government and is increasingly wary of the US. Even though Karzai is a Pashtun, many southern and eastern Pashtun tribal leaders consider him an agent of the Panjshiris. Pashtun civilians continue to bear the brunt of US military massacres.

In the Pashtun majority areas there are continuing stand-offs between a number of weak governors appointed by Karzai and local contenders for power — the best-known being Bacha (sometimes referred to as Padsha Zadran) Khan Zardran — who have strong military forces and support from Pashtun tribal chiefs.

While the US maintains an opportunistic military relationship with Pacha Khan and other anti-Karzai Pashtun warlords, Washington clearly fears that they may politically challenge Karzai's tenuous claim to be the representative of the Pashtun people.

US steps in

These political dynamics explain the sour notes that rose above the carefully orchestrated loya jirga.

The June 3 British Guardian reported that “many of the most important decisions for the loya jirga are being made in private before the 1501 [official] delegates meet… For days the Afghan cabinet and warlords from across the country have been haggling over the make-up of the government which will emerge after next week's loya jirga… All have backed Mr Karzai to stay on…

“Fortunately, there is this general understanding about the continuation of the current political system', [the Afghan foreign ministry said].”

However, on the eve of the gathering, the deal began to unravel. The 87-year-old former monarch, Zahir Shah, seemed to renege on his promise not to seek high government office.

Zahir's brief candidacy provided a rallying point for the disgruntled and disenfranchised southern and eastern Pashtun delegates, as well as some independent delegates and others from minority ethnic and religious communities also concerned at the dominance of the NA warlords. Some 800 delegates signed a petition calling for the king to be made president.

To head off the looming crisis sparked by Zahir's departure from the script, US special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad stepped in on June 10 with a heavy-handed intervention that exposed the loya jirga process as a sham.

Khalilzad summoned Zahir for “consultations”, delaying the start of the loya jirga for 24 hours. Later that day, he called a press conference at which he “clarified” Zahir's remarks, claiming Zahir had been “misinterpreted” by the press. He declared that Zahir was not a candidate for any government position. Khalilzad stated that Zahir “fully supports” Karzai's leadership.

Several hours later, Zahir sullenly appeared at a press conference at which his spokesperson repeated Khalilzad's words. As if to make sure Zahir carried out Washington's orders, Khalilzad sat by his side.

When the loya jirga finally convened on June 11, it opened with a string of set-piece speeches by the warlords, Zahir and former rival candidates in which Karzai's sole candidacy was endorsed, ensuring that Karzai would become Afghanistan's transitional president.

The June 12 Washington Post reported: “The endorsements, partly the result of US pressure on key figures to guarantee a smooth political transition, appeared to leave Karzai in such a strong political position that the loya jirga … could become little more than a rubber stamp.”

Throughout the rest of the loya jirga, the US meddling and Karzai's refusal to allow debate disillusioned the few delegates who did not represent the most powerful Afghans. The domination of the proceedings by reactionary pro-government Islamic warlords also caused tension.

“We were told that this loya jirga would not include all the people who had blood on their hands. But we see these people everywhere… I don't know whether this is a loya jirga or a commanders' council”, declared one delegate to the cheers and applause of others.

Karzai caused uproar when he cavalierly declared himself president by acclaim on the first day, ignoring provisions requiring a secret ballot. He was formally elected transitional president on June 13. Pro-government delegates filibustered throughout the meeting, preventing the loya jirga from discussing the composition of the transitional cabinet and the 160-member parliament.

Coalition strengthened

In fact, a slate of candidates for the cabinet had been drawn up before the meeting by Karzai, Khalilzad and the top warlords. With minor variations, that was the cabinet that was finally announced by Karzai on June 19. Karzai refused to allow discussion on the slate, calling for it to be “passed” with a quick show of hands.

The cabinet, sworn in on June 24, strengthened the Panjshiri-Karzai coalition's hold over the transitional government that is now tasked with preparing a new constitution and holding a general election in 2004. Fahim remains defence minister and the NA's Abdullah retained foreign affairs.

Fahim was also promoted to vice-president, along with Hazara gang leader Karim Khalili and Haji Abdul Qadir, the Pashtun governor of Nangarhar and brother of the notoriously brutal warlord, the late Abdul Haq. All are NA commanders.

The Panjshiris agreed to hand the key interior ministry to a Karzai ally, the elderly Pashtun provincial governor of Paktia, Taj Mohammed Wardek. However, former interior minister Yunus Qanooni — now education minister — will continue to pull the strings as Karzai's “advisor” on internal security.

Karzai also formalised the exclusion of the southern and eastern Pashtuns. Four of the five Pashtun ministers in the interim administration considered close to the former king were sacked, including Amanullah Khan, Bacha Khan's brother.

The Pashtun ministers brought into the government are all close Karzai allies. Zahir Shah has no formal position beyond the ceremonial title of “Father of the Nation”.

The outspoken interim minister of women's affairs, Sima Samar, was not reappointed. The number of women in the cabinet has been reduced from two to one.

Karzai also reappointed Fazul Hadi Shinwari as chief justice of the supreme court. Shinwari made international headlines in January when he said that the Islamic punishments that were rife under the Taliban, such as stonings and amputations, would be retained.

While Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan are not directly represented in the new government, they have vowed their support. Khan's son was named minister of aviation and tourism.

“Afghanistan's warlords are stronger today than they were … before the loya jirga started”, concluded Human Rights Watch's Saman Zia-Zarifi on June 19.

“The gang leaders of Afghanistan have agreed to let Mr Karzai remain leader of the next interim government”, wrote respected British Independent journalist Robert Fisk.

The loya jirga process was far from democratic, contrary to the glowing reports in most of the mainstream media.

In the weeks before the loya jirga, at least eight candidates were murdered and others were intimidated. In the regions controlled by Dostum and Ismail Khan, sustained and severe repression was directed at the Pashtun minority in an effort to reduce the overall Pashtun representation.

In a report issued on June 6, Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that warlords were “brazenly manipulating the loya jirga selection process… independent candidates [are] being detained or beaten by local commanders intent on sending their own delegates to the loya jirga. More often, warlords simply drew up their own lists of delegates and insisted that the local populace approve them.”

HRW noted that the UN and the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency Loya Jirga, which was charged with overseeing the selection of delegates, “often did not have the resources to adequately monitor and enforce the selection criteria … which were supposed to exclude delegates who had engaged in human rights abuses, criminal activity and the drug trade”.

According to a loya jirga commission official who spoke to the June 9 Washington Post, only half the delegates were “real representatives of the people”. Just 200 of the 1501 official delegates were women.

When the loya jirga finally got underway, virtually every warlord in the country was seated in the giant tent in the grounds of the Kabul university football field.

According to Ahmed Rashid, writing in the June 27 Far Eastern Economic Review, the warlords' presence was facilitated by a last-minute decision, made under pressure from Karzai and “Western diplomats”, to admit all 32 provincial governors and “an undisclosed number of major and minor warlords, all of whom had been kept out of elections according to the rules”.

The meeting was also flooded with around 200 extra “delegates”, including warlord stooges and security police beholden to the powerful Panjshiri faction. Critical delegates, especially the women, were intimidated. Sima Samar was threatened with death by reactionary Islamists who declared her “Afghanistan's Salman Rushdie”.

“Who are these other people? Why are they here? The [loya jirga] commissioner has not explained who they are. All the governors are here, the warlords are here. Who chose them?”, asked one exasperated delegate.

From Green Left Weekly, July 3, 2002.
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