EAST TIMOR: Transition still painful
August 30 is the first anniversary of East Timor's courageous act of self-determination, when, after 24 years of occupation, 78.9% of voters defied concerted Indonesian military and militia attempts to crush support for independence and voted for an end to Indonesian rule.
It's also the first anniversary of the Indonesian military making good on its promise to turn East Timor into a "sea of fire".
In the two weeks following August 30, 1999, up to 290,000 people were forced by military-backed militias across the border into West Timor. A similar number, if not more, fled their towns and villages seeking refuge in East Timor's mountainous interior. An unknown number were murdered, many in massacres in which tens or hundreds were killed at a time.
Whatever property or item of value the Indonesian military and militias could not take with them was burnt or destroyed. The capital, Dili, was all but levelled.
Of those taken to West Timor, groups of suspected independence activists and supporters were separated and disappeared. Daily intimidation and fear remains the lot of the estimated 120,000 refugees still held hostage in militia-controlled camps in West Timor.
The mayhem abated only with the arrival of the United Nations-sanctioned International Force for East Timor (Interfet) on September 20 and the formal withdrawal of Indonesian troops a week later.
UNTAET's mission
When the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) took over on October 25, it was charged with the task of overseeing the transition to full independence.
Specifically, UNTAET's mandate was to establish "an effective administration, assist in the development of civil and social services and to support capacity-building for self-government. It is also empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice."
From the start, UNTAET was confronted with a desperate emergency: meeting the basic requirements, such as food, medicine and shelter, of the hundreds of thousands of dislocated East Timorese. It began rebuilding in circumstances which East Timorese leaders have described as starting "below zero".
East Timor was already chronically underdeveloped prior to the post-ballot destruction. The devastation transformed East Timor from one of the poorest parts of south-east Asia into one of the poorest nations in the world.
As with UNAMET, the United Nations Mission for East Timor charged with running the independence ballot, UNTAET has been underfunded and under-resourced.
It has been plagued by the bureaucratic bungles typical of UN missions and by tension between UNTAET and other multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, over how project funds should be distributed. Many donor nations which have pledged significant aid and funds have been very slow on their promises.
Basic economic and social indicators paint a far from pretty picture.
The per capita income is estimated at around US$210 per year, half the 1996 level. Unemployment is 80-90%. Those East Timorese lucky to have jobs struggle to meet the cost of living, especially in Dili and the larger towns.
Just over 50% of people are under 20; children under 5 make up 13.5% of the total population. Prior to the ballot, the infant mortality rate was approximately 7-9% and deaths of East Timorese mothers during child birth were as high as 8 per 1000. These rates have now increased, due to the lack of facilities and medical staff.
The health situation of the adult population has also worsened. Malaria is endemic throughout the country, with 40 deaths and nearly 62,000 suspected cases reported since January 1. Tuberculosis is a major health problem, with one in 10 East Timorese infected with the disease.
Slow reconstruction
UNTAET has come under fire, both from within the organisation and from Timorese leaders and organisations, for the slow pace of reconstruction and the lack of progress on basic social indicators.
When UNTAET and a plethora of international aid organisations arrived in East Timor last year, representatives of East Timorese political organisations and community groups were deeply angered and frustrated by the lack of consultation.
The presence of highly paid international staff and workers in comfortable, air-conditioned offices and vehicles, along with the appearance of foreign-run and -owned businesses amidst the ruins of East Timor, added to the frustration.
The frustration has resulted in several protest actions by East Timorese students and workers. In most cases these have been spontaneous, typically involving stop-work meetings to discuss grievances or passive resistance, such as arriving late or not at all for work. Where the protests have been organised, it has been by radical forces like the Socialist Party of Timor.
Among unemployed youths and students, frustration has also been channelled into violence and gang fights in Dili and other towns. There are indications that some gangs are being used or manipulated by business interests (many Chinese-run businesses have been targeted by gangs, for example).
Some of these tensions and frustrations have eased in recent months. The involvement of East Timorese in structures such as the National Consultative Council and the newly formed cabinet has helped overcome resentment that East Timorese are not directly involved in the transition process.
And while the reconstruction process has been slow to start, most East Timorese are now enjoying better access to health care, shelter and food. In rural districts, where the planting of crops and gardens has been successful, life is getting better.
But the transition has been complicated by the rise in tension between different political and social groups, including within an elite divided over what role it should play in forthcoming elections and what state structures should be developed. So far, UNTAET does not appear to have interfered or overtly favoured one political group or party over another.
Militia destabilising
The other destabilising factor is the continuing threat posed by the militia gangs, both in the border regions and to aid workers and refugees still in West Timor.
There is increasing evidence to suggest that militia attacks on UN soldiers and humanitarian staff in the border regions have the backing of Indonesian territorial units based in West Timor and the special operations unit, Kopassus.
Since the start of the year, there have also been more than 100 incidents in which aid workers in West Timor have been attacked or threatened by militia thugs. In August there was no repatriation of refugees (except for one, by ferry) and none are likely to be repatriated before mid-September at the earliest.
The refugees have become a political bargaining chip for the militia gangs and their military masters. While ministers in President Abdurrahman Wahid's cabinet have expressed concern over the fate of the refugees, they have failed to control the officers training and arming the militias.
In a media conference following the August 15 announcement that the West Timor refugee camps would close in three to six months, Indonesian foreign minister Alwi Shihab said that, while it was "possible" the military was supporting the militias, a main factor behind the violence was "bitterness ... out of the past experience and conflict between tribes".
Shihab also acknowledged that legislation, passed by the Indonesian parliament on August 18, will make it almost impossible to try those responsible for mass killings and human rights abuses in East Timor. A clause in the law prevents charging anyone with human rights abuses which took place before the legislation came into affect.
Shihab conceded to reporters on August 21, "The ministry of foreign affairs will find it very difficult to explain the article to the world in the midst of our effort to avoid an international tribunal".
Until now, the rich countries have argued that Indonesia should be given a chance to create the appropriate court in which to try human rights violators.
According to the London-based Indonesian human rights watchdog, Tapol, such an approach has not worked. The new legislation, it said, "reinforces the case for the UN Security Council to set up an international tribunal for East Timor without delay."
BY JON LAND