How Cambodian 'news' is created

March 17, 1993
Issue 

By Nick Johnson

PHNOM PENH — The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) recently made public the presence in Cambodia of three former Vietnamese soldiers. One is an ethnic Khmer from southern Vietnam now in the Cambodian army, and two are demobilised veterans who chose to stay and married local women, and who have been serving in village militias.

While it takes considerable stretching to turn this into even a minor violation of the October 1991 peace accords [see box], the press corps here pursued this story with amazing fervour. One reporter went so far as to ask if the presence of the three Vietnamese meant that Khmer Rouge allegations of 40,000 Vietnamese troops still in Cambodia were true.

The interest in and reporting of this story parallel the media obsession with US MIAs in Vietnam — the misplaced view that wars are and should be "clean" and the human elements able to be neatly categorised.

It is a pity that these same reporters are not pursuing stories of active Thai military presence in Khmer Rouge zones, or of French involvement in military and police training, or even of rumours of US reconnaissance of an unused military airport in Kompong Chhnang as a replacement for the former Clark air base in the Philippines.

Four main foreign elements can be identified in reporting from Cambodia: that of Japanese, other Asian and two types of Westerners.

The Japanese have the largest presence and most sophisticated technology. Their major interest is in the Japanese force. Thai and to a lesser extent Malaysian and Singaporean reporting combines political and straight news with a blend of business and trade.

Western media are represented by the established agencies and a number of stringers, usually writing for commission only or on very modest stipends. As well, correspondents for major media outlets and TV crews visit frequently. These latter go for the grand sweep, the generalisation that provides background and international context but does not get into detail or regional nuances. It is left to the local stringers to provide this picture, but they seem to have failed.

The press pack is largely dependent on sources and official

briefings. UNTAC gives a daily conference as well as informal "backgrounders" in a hotel bar most nights. As well, the Information and Education Component cultivates journalists and provides some useful data. Other sectors of UNTAC and international agencies put out regular press releases — generally in English, sometimes French but rarely in Khmer.

The State of Cambodia has a weekly briefing and senior officials are available on mobile telephones. Other political parties put out news sheets and are more than happy to answer inquiries. The Khmer Rouge has recently started conferences, though those reporters who do attend find simple yes/no answers impossible to obtain.

With the presence of 20,000 UN peacekeepers and sophisticated logistics and backup, access to most of the country has never been easier. Helicopters fly daily, boats ply the rivers, 4WDs traverse the roads. Only Khmer Rouge areas are closed, and even these have been chipped away at. UNTAC contact with local KR commanders has built up some trust, and the UN presence has created some options to local people for the first time in many years.

But where are the incisive reports? What we get, most of the time, is bland repetition of press releases and glorified tourism. There have been many wasted opportunities to get onto the record observations of life and conditions in areas that have been isolated from the rest of the world for several decades.

The situation cries out for informed, unbiased reporting, based on a sense of history and knowledge of the place. Instead, stories are often a reflection of particular barrows being pushed. One reporter in Phnom Penh constructs his stories entirely around sources, embassy and UNTAC officials, always anonymously. Even if the official spokesperson, often the source's boss, states something different, this reporter sticks by his privileged information and builds a case to match his interpretation.

With such a large UN military role, many analyses reflect military matters; every armchair strategist is having a field day. Also, Western concepts on human rights are strongly pushed, so lots is written from that perspective. The danger is that Cambodia is being defined by these biases and by specific interest groups.

The State of Cambodia administration is often seen as an easy mark. One reporter traversed a road where "displaced people", fleeing fighting, were "huddled" at a roadside and asserted they paid bribes to SoC army to pass to safety. This journalist made no inquiry as to what they were

fleeing, or what practices the KR had put into place when it took over their villages.

Another reporter criticised SoC military who were conniving in traffic of stolen cars from Thailand, yet managed to say nothing against the crime rings that steal the vehicles there nor the Thai border soldiers who, presumably for a cut, let them pass into Cambodia.

In the interests of building a story that will sell (the need of all stringers), stories are often beat-ups. Politically motivated violence is a current issue: it even has an acronym, PMV. Many reports have gone out uncritically attributing these acts to SoC.

The royalist party, FUNCINPEC, makes repeated claims about harassment and intimidation from SoC. Perfect copy: claims reported as fact. A more informed analysis recently appeared in an UNTAC newsletter, Free Choice. It pointed out that banditry was the major problem, and political "dirty tricks" were practised by most parties. It quoted a local teacher as saying, "FUNCINPEC says that if we are holding their membership card, it will be easier to find work after they win the election."

The report added that the UNTAC provincial administrator in Battambang said that in many cases of intimidation, it was impossible to assess who the culprits are, that it is "possible FUNCINPEC organised some of the attacks themselves". They "have many conflicts within their own ranks and want to blame SoC for these incidents".

Definitely, there is fear and confusion about the changing political landscape in Cambodia. The level of violence needs to be reduced. The jargon is about a "neutral political environment" and "free and fair elections". UNTAC emphasis has changed from demobilisation of factions, a job not achieved, to ensuring that the ballot is conducted in secret and in safety.

The UN has much invested in Cambodia and will see the elections through. The major sticking point is still that the Khmer Rouge, after having signed the peace accords, have not participated. Pol Pot sits in the jungle and dreams of retaking power by military means. UNTAC has a policy that "the door is always open" and purports to hope that the KR will change its ways. UN efforts to bring peace and stability are only window-dressing until the root cause of insecurity and fear — the presence of a genocidal clique waiting in the wings — is somehow removed.

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