The political crisis caused by the refusal of the head of the Nepalese Army to implement instructions from the elected civilian government is continuing in Nepal.
The crisis resulted in the resignation of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist from the government it led. This occurred after attempts to sack the insubordinate head of the military were countered by the right-wing president and the UCPN-M's own coalition partners.
In response, the Maoists called for street protests against this anti-democratic move, while anti-Maoist parties have attempted negotiations to form a new government without the UCPN-M.
However, with the Maoists controlling 40% of the parliament, and anger expressed on the streets, the anti-Maoist forces have been unable to form a new government. The Maoists are refusing to participate in any government, or allow parliament to meet, until its demand for the sacking of Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal is met.
Daily street demonstrations are continuing. The leaders of the UCPN-M have called for them to be strengthened.
May 17 has been set as a "national day of action" against the undemocratic moves and to support the sacking of Katawal. Mass demonstrations are scheduled across the country.
Below, Green Left Weekly correspondent in Kathmandu, Ben Peterson, explains what is at stake. You can also read Peterson's blog for more commentary at
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The real issue at the centre of the recent political events is the question of power and the creation of a new Nepali state.
Up until 2006, Nepal was ruled by a autocratic monarchy. A 1990 mass movement known as the Jana Andolan (people's uprising) had won limited democratic reforms. But the king still retained much of his power.
This finally ended in 2006, when the pressure of the Maoist "people's war" combined with urban mass protests led mostly by the "Seven Party Alliance", made up of the mainstream parliamentary parties.
These two forces combined to launch the "Jana Andolan II" — a 19-day uprising that paralysed the nation and brought a final end to the monarchy.
This movement was supposed to be the point from which a new and democratic Nepal was created.
But the process of creating the new is proving to be more difficult than destroying the old. While this process initially moved swiftly, it has since stalled.
There are deep divisions between the political groups on the road forward.
It was agreed that a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution would be elected. The civil war in the countryside was brought to an end. The Maoist combatants moved into United Nations-monitored camps. It was agreed they would be integrated into a new national army.
But while these agreements were reached, it was exactly when important decisions were to be carried out that the problems started to occur.
In April 2008, the Maoists won twice the number of seats than the next largest party in assembly elections. The consensus between the non-royalist parties came crashing down.
The mass pro-democracy movement had united against the king. With the king gone, so was the basis for unity.
The parties now in parliament have very different and often mutually exclusive visions for Nepal.
The forces led by the Maoists are calling for radical change. The Maoists are pushing for drastic institutional change and wish to set up a "New Nepal" on the basis of a federal state that gives rights to various ethnic minorities.
The Maoists are also seeking to establish previously denied rights for women and Dalits (the so-called untouchables — the lowest caste according to the Hindu religion).
Achieving such a goal requires a significant restructuring of the Nepali state and society. This is dangerous to those forces currently in positions of power.
This is especially true of the two traditional "major parties", the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party Nepal-Unified-Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML).
Following the limited democratic space after the 1990 uprising, these two parties made significant electoral gains. This led to them becoming largely fused into Nepal's extensive bureaucracies and power structures — neglecting the vast majority of Nepal's rural poor.
In theory, disagreements about Nepal's future should have been decided by the people in the assembly elections. The Maoists received a broad electoral mandate for their agenda.
The NC and CPN-UML were deserted by voters. The Maoists won more seats than the NC and NPC-UML combined.
While the Maoists did not win an absolute majority of the assembly, the Maoist vote was almost a million greater than any other party. Further, the Maoists, when combined with ethnic-based parties that split from them and other smaller left parties make up more than 60% of the assembly.
The vote was a decisive endorsement of a radical, pro-poor vision for Nepal's future.
However, attempts to implement this vision have been impeded at every step by the bureaucracy, military, media, local elite and international power centres. The UCPN-M-led government was toothless — its decisions aimed at meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed minorities were scuttled.
This includes the national budget, which remains largely unimplemented.
This came to a head over the issues surrounding the army high command. Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal repeatedly disobeyed the directives of the defence ministry, placing the military outside of civilian control.
Katawal, a royalist who is the former king's adopted brother, has sought to defend the status by refusing the implement key parts of the peace accords that ended the armed conflict.
Wary of the Nepalese military's dark history of organising coups, the government made the moves within the interim constitution to sack Katawal.
President Ram Baran Yadav, from the NC and whose role is largely ceremonial, went outside the constitution to order Katawal reinstated. With its coalition partners refusing to support it, the UCPN-M resigned.
It was abundantly clear that while the Maoists had led the government, power lay in the hands of opposing parties and the unelected bureaucracy.
Foreign ambassadors played a central role in placing pressure on all political forces, including the Maoists, to not move against Katawal.
The Indian government, in particular, feels threatened by radical change due to its security and economic interests in Nepal. It threatened the Maoists with crippling economic sanctions if Katawal was sacked.
The anti-democratic moves have created sizeable public discontent. It has made clear to the poor majority the difference between having an elected government and holding real state power.
People are demanding that the anti-democratic actions of the president be repealed. This has also created a dilemma for the NC and the CPN-UML. The agreements that they signed before the elections, expecting they would be the winners, now favour the Maoists.
The elite have temporarily been able to protect their bureaucratic/military base. However, they have paid a high price in terms of their political legitimacy.
To continue to protect their power bases, they will have to increasingly move outside of the constitution and established agreements — risking further anger from ordinary people.
Complicating matters further for the elite is the continued existence of the Maoist People's Liberation Army, with around 20,000 fighters. This drastically limits the potential for a traditional military coup, by which the elite could restore its order.
The current political situation is one of uncertainty. The elite has shown it will not relinquish power even to a democratically elected government.
Recent events have not resolved the contradictions and power struggles within Nepal, but only made them worse. Who will win and who will lose remains to be seen.