War in the Balkans: the aftermath

October 14, 1998
Issue 

By Paul Aiken

Three years after the Croatian army took control of the Serbian-held areas of Croatia, those who were caught between the warring parties continue to face enormous obstacles in their attempts to return to their homes and way of life. For those whose homes lay in the former UN Sector South (also known as northern Dalmatia or the Krajina), forces often beyond their control still shape their future.

The after-effects of the conflict are still strongly felt in the region — an area of great symbolic and strategic importance to the Croatian state. Much of that importance focuses on the region's main town, Knin.

Between 1991 and 1995, the Krajina (literally meaning frontier or border, traditionally describing a crescent-shaped area hugging the border with Bosnia from the Dalmatian hinterlands up towards the towns of Karlovac and Kostanica in the north) was part of a greater area within Croatia (the Republic of Serbian Krajina — RSK) which was under the de facto control of rebel ethnic Serb forces.

In 1995, the Croatian army ended the rule of the RSK with two military operations, "Flash" and "Storm". As a result of Operation Storm, approximately 180,000 people of Serb ethnicity fled their homes for other Serb-held areas of former Yugoslavia.

Many of these people now wish to return, and the Croatian government has recently adopted — under pressure from the European Union, USA and international organisations — a plan designed to facilitate their return.

The UN high commissioner for refugees, Sadako Ogata, has referred to 1998 as "the year of return" in former Yugoslavia. But the difficulties faced by those wishing to come back and those local organisations working on their behalf sometimes seem insurmountable.

Many of these difficulties are visible in Knin, located on the country's main north-south highway (linking the capital, Zagreb, with the Adriatic coast). Gaining control of Knin — a seat of power in Croatia's ancient history — during Operation Storm is considered to have been an important victory for the newly independent state (Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991).

Return of refugees

The return of ethnic Serb inhabitants (Serbs began settling in the region several hundred years ago) appears to be considered, at different levels of Croatian society, as undermining the gains of that military success.

Because so much of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had the intention of dividing and relocating the civilian population, a consequence in the postwar period is a wide distribution of refugees who have fled in many different directions from many different places.

Refugees must be housed somewhere and, in Croatia under the law on "temporary takeover" (adopted specifically to address this issue), the unoccupied houses and flats of those who had fled often became the new homes for those who had arrived.

In Knin, the houses and flats of many ethnic Serbs were subsequently occupied by ethnic Croats from Bosnia and Hercegovina. The original houses and flats of the Bosnian Croats are now likely to be occupied by refugees from another region.

Many of the ethnic Serbs who wish to return to Knin are unable to reoccupy their homes. Legal procedures to regain their lost tenancy rights are lengthy and sometimes inconsistent; court decisions are often not enforced by local authorities.

The Bosnian Croats are unwilling to leave these houses and flats, as they would themselves then be in danger of homelessness. Multi-way return has not been extensively successful, and there are many refugees who simply do not want to go back to their homes.

Those who have already fled at least once from fighting and who, in many cases, have been occupying the houses and flats for a number of years, have a genuine fear of being forced to move on once again.

This vulnerability amongst Bosnian Croat refugees in Knin is a significant factor in the fear and mistrust which have built up in regard to Serb returnees. Their fear of being evicted and forced to return to Bosnia is substantially fuelled by the media as well as nationalist political parties. Isolated and vulnerable, the Bosnian Croat community has become hostile to the return process, and returnees often face this hostility.

Potential returnees to Knin also face a high rate of unemployment (as high as 80% has been reported), lack of infrastructure (Serb returnees typically face severe delays in the connection of power, water and telephone services, delays less common for Croats in the region), inflexible bureaucracy and municipal authorities who are often unhelpful or even antagonistic.

The two last factors especially combine to make life very difficult for returnees and the organisations that work on their behalf. Many of the local human rights and humanitarian groups say that the bureaucracy sometimes makes them feel powerless.

Housing, humanitarian assistance, social security, citizenship and property all rely upon documents that must be either obtained from or validated by municipal bureaucracies. These bodies consequently have great power over the fate of returnees, most of whom do not have the resources to appeal to higher authorities.

It therefore falls upon local organisations to appeal on their behalf. This often brings local activists into direct conflict with municipal authorities and often results in the organisations themselves being targeted.

Many of these organisations feel that the recently adopted government plan for return is positive in principle but that there are loopholes which will allow local authorities to obstruct change.

Housing commissions

The return plan establishes local housing commissions, which will be responsible for administering the principles set forth in the official document, namely ensuring that housing is provided for both returnees (preferably in their original houses) and refugees.

The commissions are to be monitored by a central committee, including Croatian government officials and representatives of international organisations, but they are under the control of local mayors. Many mayors have already demonstrated their antagonism to the return process, and so the ability of the commissions to enforce the rights of returnees and reach settlements which take into account the needs of all parties is uncertain.

While much political importance is placed by Zagreb upon the return plan, deadlines for the establishment of the Housing commissions have not been met in many cases, operating instructions produced for the commissions are very vague, and the appointments to some commissions raises concern about their likely effectiveness.

The return plan is the result of international political pressure and the Croatian government's wish to be accepted into EU bodies and programs. Much effort is being put by the government into appearing to be acceding to international wishes in regard to human rights.

It is at the local level that the success of the return plan will be determined, because it is at this level at which individual decisions will be made and enforced — or not, as has often been the case until now. One local activist refers to the return process as in a "state of stagnation" and is waiting to see whether it will be implemented at a local level or will simply remain another piece of paper.

Returnees' lives are already made difficult enough by pieces of paper (citizenship documents, proofs of ownership of property, work or taxation history) and by the bureaucracy from which they must be obtained. It is hoped that the return plan (which brings with it more forms and more demands for documents, which were often destroyed or lost during the war) will not place further obstacles to reclaiming some sort of quality of life.

Otvorene Oci (the Croatian branch of the Balkan Peace Team) has established a satellite office in Knin, in recognition of the importance of a significant presence in the area to our work with local human rights organisations and providing an opportunity to collect more comprehensive information on the return process.

The greater amount of time now spent with local organisations helps to alleviate the sense of isolation and vulnerability felt by many of their activists. Not only do many offices operate in geographically remote areas, but activists also often feel isolated from the communities in which they are working, when there is hostility towards returnees which may be redirected towards them.

[The author is currently working for a non-government aid organisation called the Balkan Peace Team. BPT's financial situation is dire. If anyone is able to help BPT continue their work, donations of any size can be deposited in Commonwealth Bank savings account no. 064158 10156204.]

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