Eva Cheng

On April 11, more than 20,000 people marched to China’s central government liaison office in Hong Kong. They were protesting Beijing’s backtrack from a promise, made before the 1997 handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China, that the territory would enjoy “a high degree of autonomy”.

This was at least the fifth time the Hong Kong people have mobilised en masse since July 1 last year to defend their democratic rights. On July 1, 500,000 people marched to oppose Beijing’s “anti-subversion” law in Hong Kong, and two further marches took place that month. Another 100,000 people came out for democracy on January 1.

Before the handover, there were widespread fears that China would rule Hong Kong dictatorially. To address those concerns, Beijing promised substantial local autonomy to the territory’s 6 million people, leaving it essentially to them to decide on most local matters, including the territory’s anticipated electoral reforms. Hong Kong was named a “special administrative region”. These promises, and more, were spelled out in Hong Kong’s Basic Law, its post-1997 “mini-constitution”.

But there were some interim restrictions. Universal suffrage to elect the territory’s chief executive and the local legislature will only be permitted in mid-2007 and 2008 respectively. Only 24 seats of Hong Kong’s 60-seat legislature chamber are popularly elected now. Moreover, Beijing handpicked Hong Kong’s chief executive, Tung Chee-Hwa, through the facade of “election” by an 800-member panel.

To ensure these popular votes take place without delay, the Hong Kong democracy movement has campaigned for them since 1997 as a top priority.

Anticipating differences which might arise, it was agreed before 1997 that the final interpretation of the Basic Law would be in the hands of Hong Kong courts, in line with the common law framework that Hong Kong had been using before 1997.

The exceptions include matters such as defence, foreign policy and the relationship between Hong Kong and the Beijing “central government”, which Beijing will retain the final say on. Undertaking this task officially for Beijing is the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s rubber-stamp parliament.

However, this agreement was first breached in 1999 when the NPC barred 1.6 million mainland citizens who have residents’ rights in Hong Kong from exercising those rights. The NPC based its decision on its own “interpretation” of a provision of the Basic Law, which is an area that it does not have jurisdiction on.

On April 6, the NPC standing committee tried again to expand its power of interpretation of the Basic Law, by transferring the right to initiate electoral changes in Hong Kong to Hong Kong’s chief executive.

Quite apart from a violation of the Basic Law that this attempt entails, Tung enjoys extremely poor local support. A University of Hong Kong survey revealed on April 12 that 67% of those surveyed opposed Tung holding the top job, and only 15% supported him.

The NPC’s move is also a classic case of amendments dressed up as “interpretations” of the Basic Law, a practice long feared in Hong Kong. Shocked by the move, Hong Kong democracy campaigners demanded that a senior Beijing delegation that was in Hong Kong on April 7-9 promise that such interpretation attempts wouldn’t happen again. The delegation refused, asserting the “central government’s” supreme rights, and claiming the “high degree of autonomy” that Beijing promised was never meant to be full autonomy.

In recent debate on Hong Kong’s democratic reforms, Beijing, through its mouthpieces and stooges in Hong Kong, warned that those who stand for election in Hong Kong should be vetted for “patriotism” (i.e., being pro-Beijing). They even suggested that the legislature might be dissolved if a majority of those elected were democracy campaigners.

From Green Left Weekly, April 21, 2004.
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