BY SARAH STEPHEN
A deepening of Australia's military alliance with the United States
was heralded by the February 26 launch of Australia's National Security
— a Defence Update 2003. While much of the 25-page document foreshadows
only marginal and rhetorical adjustments to defence policy, the update
flags two significant changes to the 2000 defence white paper: more direct
participation in the US “strategic missile defence” program and an increased
likelihood of military involvement in “coalition operations further afield”.
The latter is justified on the basis of the “changed global strategic
environment ... shaped by the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction”, and “the likelihood that Australian national
interests could be affected by events outside of Australia's immediate
neighbourhood”.
Following talks between the two governments in 2001, Australia is making
a concerted effort to enhance its armed forces' compatibility with the
US military — from communications systems to training and equipment.
The Australian government has its own reasons for operating as a willing
and enthusiastic junior partner to the United States. In 1999, Howard referred
to his government as Washington's “deputy peacekeeper” in the Asia-Pacific
region. While he later attempted to distance himself from this comment,
it remains true.
While the interests of US and Australian elites often diverge, the Howard
government and its supporters believe that the US is an efficient enforcer
of the system of global exploitation by First World big business, including
Australian corporations. In defence minister Robert Hill's words, it is
in Australia’s interests to “work closely with [the US] in supporting a
more secure and stable world”.
But Howard and Hill also want a defence force capable of putting down
insurgencies, revolts, revolutions or governments that challenge Australia's
exploitation of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Defence Update 2003 makes it clear that the strengthening of
the US alliance is not at the expense of the main thrust of the 200 white
paper: equipping the Australian military to intervene more decisively in
the Asia-Pacific region. Keeping this region secure for Australian and
US corporations to continue to make profits remains a priority.
In recent months, the Australian government has signed anti-terrorism
agreements with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and, on
March 8, with Fiji. According to a March 4 Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade press release announcing the Philippines agreement, they provide
“a framework for increased cooperation between security, intelligence,
law enforcement and defence officials”.
Police commissioner Mick Keelty told Radio National's Asia-Pacific program
on March 6 that the counter-terrorism agreements would ensure the region
was “safe” for business.
Such agreements will give Australia important cover for intervening
against local people's struggles, such as the Acehnese and West Papuan
struggles for independence from Indonesia and the Moro people's independence
fight in the southern Philippines. Some of the organisations involved in
these struggles have already been identified on the United Nations' list
of terrorist organisations.
Defence Update 2003 calls for an upgrading of links with Indonesia's
brutal Kopassus special forces, on the pretext that it would “improve Jakarta's
ability to cope with terrorist threats”. Eager to re-establish military
ties with Jakarta, the Australian government is happy to overlook the fact
that Kopassus forms part of one of the most brutal state terrorist forces
in the region, overseeing ongoing brutality and killings in West Papua
and Aceh.
At the same time as the white paper is being discussed, Howard's government
signalled its support for the US National Missile Defence Scheme (NMD),
dubbed the “son of Star Wars” scheme.
Misnamed as a ”defence” system, NMD is designed to shore up the Washington's
ability to attack whoever it likes, whenever it likes, with minimal risk
of counterattack, to protect the interests of US imperialism at home and
abroad.
Despite a vote condemning the scheme in the Senate last June, the Howard
government is considering accepting the US government's offer of giving
coverage to its allies with the “defensive shield”. Australia already plays
an important role in supporting NMD through the US spy base at Pine Gap
in South Australia.
Former US president Ronald Reagan's original scheme was supposed to
provide protection from a massive Soviet nuclear strike (and would have
been useful if the US chose to strike first).
Now, the Bush gang's justification for the NMD program is to prevent
nuclear strikes by “rogue states” such as North Korea, which presently
has no capacity to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (and won't
for 10 years from the time it decides to build them); or from Iraq, Iran,
Libya or Syria — none of which has missiles capable of reaching the US.
Washington also argues that the US is vulnerable to attacks from terrorists
who get their hands on ballistic missiles: also highly improbable.
In launching Defence Update 2003, Hill argued that NMD “may be
a necessary ... form of security protection”. It seems that the tiny, impoverished
nation of North Korea is the Howard government's enemy of choice, for now.
Hill has described North Korea's long-range missile program as “particularly
worrying”.
The Bush administration is also considering sea- and space-based systems.
Sea-based systems (also known as Theatre Missile Defence) would aim to
protect US troops overseas, as well as US allies such as Taiwan. There
are also claims that US civilian and military satellites require protection
and, therefore, a major militarisation of space.
The Howard government seems to be testing the waters on Australian’s
support for the scheme. Despite Howard’s comments, the white paper is vague
on the question. In a press conference to launch the white paper, Hill
cautioned that it was a “very complex, expensive, scientifically challenging
task”.
There are two reasons for concern about NMD. Much of the criticism of
NMD has focused on the stupidity of the plan, since it is doubtful that
a missile defence system could prevent even a limited, unsophisticated
missile attack. Despite ploughing US$130 billion dollars since 1983 into
developing and testing the scheme, most tests have failed. The challenge
of knocking missiles out of the sky is akin to hitting a bullet with a
bullet.
Secondly, and more seriously, US plans could spark new arms and missile
races: Russia and China are likely to increase their own “defensive” systems
in response. The arms build-up could spread to India, Pakistan and beyond.
The extension of NMD to incorporate the “defence” of Australia, which would
require the positioning of expensive ground- and sea-based missiles, draws
this country very squarely into that arms race.
Australian support for NMD is critical, as much of the intelligence
data for the NMD is gathered at Pine Gap. The Australian Defence Science
and Technology Organisation has been involved in collaborative research
on ballistic missile detection with the US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation
since 1995. The US military is also planning to establish a rocket range
in Western Australia as a testing ground for its Theatre Missile Defence
— and already has the full support of the federal government.
In a February 27 article, the Australian's national security
editor asks the question “how much longer can Australia go on spending
a niggardly 1.8% of GDP on defence”, arguing that Hill's “ambitious rhetoric”
in launching the update needed to be matched with “genuine enhancement
of Australia's overall military capacity”.
Hill had originally argued within cabinet for a $1.5 billion funding
boost, which was rejected. The final document makes no suggestion of a
funding increase. The 2000 white paper already foreshadowed an increase
in defence spending of $1 billion in the 2003-04 financial year. Whether
more will be added will be revealed in the May federal budget.
From Green Left Weekly, March 12, 2003.
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