RAMALLAH — The events of the last 20 days in Palestine are without doubt
the most significant since the signing of the Oslo Accords in September
1993. They have brought to the fore the tensions inherent in any solution
to the Palestinian question that does not tackle the fundamental problem
in the Middle East: the role of imperialism and its client state of Israel. 
The weeks prior to the Al Aqsa intifada (uprising), as it has become
known, were routine in every sense of the word. The negotiations were —
we were informed by all concerned — in their perpetual state of deadlock.
Life continued as normal for most Palestinians: the checkpoints, the frustration
and the familiar sight of Israeli settlements overlooking Palestinian towns.
That normality was shattered after the massacre of seven worshippers
in the Al Aqsa mosque on September 29. It soon became clear that the clashes
were of a different nature than the demonstrations in recent years.
The official Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) report on the clashes, published
on October 13, states that Palestinians claim the demonstrations were caused
by the September 28 visit of Israeli Likud Party leader, Ariel Sharon,
to the area surrounding Al Aqsa mosque. Some Palestinians do claim this,
a claim that has been repeated by the media internationally.
There is good reason for Palestinians to be angry. Sharon was convicted
of being responsible for the massacre of thousands of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon in the camps of Sabra and Shatilla during the 1980s.
However, the reasons lie much deeper than Sharon's murderous past. After
all, most Israeli leaders share this trait. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak was a general in the army and is well known for his execution of
unarmed Palestinians and his role in the assassination of Palestinian intellectuals,
such as Kamal Nasir. Israeli Labor Party deputy leader Shimon Peres ordered
the bombing of the Qana UN camp in Lebanon, where villagers were seeking
shelter from Israeli air raids in 1996.
The demonstrations over the last few weeks have been of a mass character.
All sections of the population have been involved and social solidarity
probably reached the greatest level since the Oslo process began. The reasons
for the demonstrations strike at the heart of Oslo and what has happened
on the ground since September 1993.
Since Oslo, Israel has cemented and extended its occupation of the West
Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. In all areas, life has got worse for the
majority of Palestinians.
Land
grab
Illegal Israeli Jewish-only settlements have expanded across
the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. By the end of 1967, there were
just three settlements; by mid-1999 this had risen to 195, of which there
were 18 in Gaza Strip and 177 in the West Bank (including Jerusalem).
The settler population is increasing at a faster rate than the Israeli
population as a whole. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of statistics,
it grew by 7.6% in 1998 in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip, compared
to 2.3% in the Israeli population overall.
In 1999, the Israeli government confiscated 40,178 dunams of Palestinian
land (1 dunam equals 1000 square metres). Of this, 19,691 was to be used
for settlement expansion. Since 1967, 73% of the land in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip has been confiscated by the Israeli government. The fact
that Israel doesn't intend to return this land at the conclusion of any
deal is demonstrated by the fact that Israel's structural plan for 2020
allows for 310,000 settlers in the West Bank.
The same pattern is replicated in Jerusalem. Since 1967, 15 settlements
have been erected within East Jerusalem, occupying 24 square kilometres
(34%) of East Jerusalem. The settler population in East Jerusalem alone
is 180,000 (compared to 210,000 Palestinians living in the eastern part
of the city).
As has been clearly demonstrated over the last few weeks, the settler
population is by and large an armed paramilitary group that presents a
grave danger to the Palestinian population.
Palestinians are prohibited by Israel from building in approximately
60% of the West Bank, 40% of the Gaza Strip and 87% of Jerusalem. Since
1967, more than 6000 Palestinian homes have been demolished in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and 2500 in East Jerusalem.
There has been an increase in the demolition of Palestinian homes since
the beginning of the Oslo Accords: between then and April 1999, 946 homes
have been demolished. More than 60% of Palestinians in Jerusalem now live
in a housing density of three or more persons per room — three times more
crowded than Jewish houses in Jerusalem.
House demolition is one plank in an Israeli government strategy to ethnically
cleanse Jerusalem of Palestinian residents. Another technique is the confiscation
of Palestinian ID cards, which forces Palestinian residents to live outside
the city. Between 1996 and 1999, more than 2200 Jerusalemite ID cards were
confiscated.
Israel also refuses to implement Palestinian refugees' right of return.
In 1948, with the colonisation of the historic land of Palestine, around
750,000 Palestinians were evicted from their land. Four hundred and eighteen
Palestinian villages were depopulated and destroyed.
Following the establishment of Israel, laws were passed denying Palestinians
the right to return home and expropriating their homes and land. These
laws are still in force.
The Absentees' Property Law of 1950 created a Custodian for Absentee
Property, in which the legal and equitable title of “absentee” property
was entirely divested. An absentee could reclaim their property only if
they could prove that they had left their place of residence “for fear
that the enemies of Israel might cause him harm”. The law thus excludes
the majority of Palestinians who had fled in fear of attack from Israeli
forces. An estimated 3.25 million dunums of land was expropriated under
this legislation.
The constant denial by Israel of the right of return, and even responsibility
for what remains the world's longest and largest refugee crisis, is critical
to understanding Palestinians' anger at the so-called peace process.
Since the Oslo Accords, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been continuously
subjected to arbitrary closures by the Israeli government. This results
in severe restrictions on movement, and, since Palestinian-controlled areas
do not form a contiguous entity under the accords, Palestinian towns and
villages are easily isolated from one another.
The Israeli authorities have been known to impose blockades, which make
movement of Palestinians virtually impossible and impede humanitarian relief.
Blockades were implemented during the recent events, and are still in place.
Closures cause considerable economic hardship by preventing Palestinian
workers who earn their living in Israel from getting to work. They often
result in the waste of Palestinian agricultural produce as vegetables and
the like rot, and in the case of Gaza, the ban on fisherpeople going to
sea denies them the possibility of an income.
The closures in the occupied territories are a form of collective punishment
which violates article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and also the
right to the freedom of movement enshrined in article 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Israeli violence
It has been clear throughout the clashes that the population is fighting
with one thing in mind: freedom from occupation. Oslo has run its course
and people are finally saying enough is enough.
Israel responded with a brutality that many of the post-intifada generation
had not witnessed before. Israel, which has one of the largest and most
modern armies in the world, receives more military aid from the US than
any other country in the world.
Between October 18 and September 29, more than 100 Palestinians were
killed and 4000 were wounded. Five Israeli soldiers were killed. On October
8, Defence for Children International reported:
“In the Gaza Strip, Israeli military forces demolished two residential
buildings, leaving more than 240 Palestinian children without homes. As
confrontations continue at the northern entrance of Al-Bireh, most residents
of the Belu'a and Jebel Al-Taweel neighbourhoods have fled after having
been warned to do so by the Israeli army. Similar warnings were issued
to inhabitants of the Old City of Hebron and in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip.”
The Palestinian human rights organisation Addameer reported on October
8, “Tanks, heavy artillery, helicopters, have been deployed around all
Palestinian cities in Gaza. Bulldozers have demolished portions of the
streets near Netzarim for a military base. In Al Zahra neighbourhood in
Gaza under Palestinian Authority control, Israeli troops have taken over
the area. The area is a new neighbourhood built primarily to house Palestinian
returnees. In the past few hours, Israeli settlers have taken to the streets
and are attacking Palestinians throughout the West Bank, Gaza and 1948
areas.”
Israeli forces also executed Palestinian citizens in Israel. The case
of the brutal slaying of 17-year-old Aseel Hassan 'Assalih from the town
of 'Arrabeh in the Upper Galilee shocked the world, particularly since
Aseel was active in an organization promoting reconciliation between Israelis
and Palestinians. According to eyewitness testimony, Aseel was shot in
the neck after being caught and beaten by Israeli soldiers on October 3.
He had been chanting slogans with his friends at the time.
One characteristic of the clashes was the violence employed by Israeli
settlers, backed and supported by the Israeli military. As Defence for
Children International reported on October 8:
“Last night, Israeli settlers, under the protection of the Israeli army,
attacked Palestinian cities and private property throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, both in residential areas and at crossroads between
Palestinian towns. In the Qalqilyeh region, over eight villages were attacked,
including Kufr Haris, Salfit, Deir 'Istiya, Al-Funduq, Jeet, 'Azzoun, Masha,
and Huwarra. In the latter of which, Israeli settlers kidnapped two Palestinian
civilians and burned the homes of Huwarra residents. In nearby Bidiya,
22-year-old Fahed Mustafa Baker died after having been shot in the head
by Israeli settlers. Another Palestinian civilian from Al-Funduq village
remains in critical condition after being attacked by settlers with a wooden
plank studded with nails.”
Mass support
The significance of the events of the last few weeks are illustrated in
three features not witnessed for many years in the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict: the depth of mass participation in the Palestinian demonstrations
and related activities; the struggle of Palestinians living inside the
state of Israel; and the enormous solidarity from around the world, in
particular, the Arab masses of neighbouring countries.
Daily life in all West Bank and Gaza Strip towns and villages came to
a standstill as the population lent support to the demonstrations. Particularly
in the larger cities, such as Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron and Gaza, tens of
thousands participated in the actions. Schools went on strike and a general
strike lasted in most areas for more than seven days.
The Palestinian Chamber of Commerce declared rolling strikes in solidarity
with the demonstrations. A movement to boycott Israeli products was organised
through non-government organisations and youth groups visited shops to
encourage compliance with the boycott. Thousands flocked to hospitals to
donate urgently needed blood for the wounded.
In response to the armed attacks by para-military bands of Israeli settlers,
villages formed self-defence leagues.
One of the most significant features of the clashes was the participation
of Palestinians living within the state of Israel. The attempts of Israel
to separate the Palestinian people along geographic and religious lines
— the Israeli government calls these people “Israeli Arabs”, not Palestinians
— were shown to have failed. By October 20, 13 Palestinians had been killed
by Israeli police inside Israel. Demonstrations by Palestinians inside
Israel have not reached such a level for more than 40 years.
The participation extended across all areas and cities. Particularly
in the north, where Palestinian villages such as Nazareth are located close
to Palestinian villages in the West Bank such as Jenin and Tulkarem, demonstrations
were heavily coordinated across the artificial lines of division. In one
particularly memorable moment, thousands of Palestinians in Ramallah mobilised
at 10.30pm when the killing of a Palestinian in Nazareth was announced.
It was clear that neither the Israeli government nor the Palestinian
Authority had expected such a show of solidarity from Palestinians inside
Israel.
Similarly, the extent of solidarity from Arabs in neighbouring countries
was completely unexpected. It was this movement, in itself an expression
of the latent anger of the Arab masses against imperialist influence and
the collusion of their own governments with Israel and the US, which forced
the US to take an active role in attempting to diffuse the situation.
This movement placed the Arab regimes in a contradictory position. On
one hand they were forced to express solidarity with the Palestinian people,
on the other, they took a strong stance against the mass mobilisations
occurring in their own countries.
For example, in Jordan, whose regime has particularly close economic
and military ties with Israel, mass demonstrations called for an end to
these ties and were directed against the Israeli embassy. The Jordanian
monarchy sent helicopters to the West Bank to airlift the most seriously
injured to Jordanian hospitals for medical treatment. At the same time,
they banned demonstrations in Amman and two Jordanians were killed by the
Jordanian army in the ensuing clashes.
Likewise, Egypt lent vocal support to the Palestinian cause but locked
students into one of the major universities to prevent a planned demonstration
outside the US embassy.
The strongest organised solidarity for the Palestinian movement came
from the Lebanese resistance movement, Hizbullah. This powerful, mass-based
Islamic movement in the south of Lebanon is extremely popular inside Palestine,
despite the fact Hizbullah draws its roots from Shiite Islam whereas the
majority of Palestinians follow the rival Sunni sect.
Hizbullah's popularity stems from its militant and uncompromising struggle
against Israel's occupation of Lebanon and its non-sectarian approach to
all political tendencies.
Hizbullah caught everyone by surprise through its kidnapping of three
Israeli soldiers from the Lebanese border following a demonstration by
Palestinians from refugee camps in Lebanon. Hizbullah's demand was simple:
release all political prisoners in Israeli jails. There are 12 Lebanese
political prisoners and 1600 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli
jails, a number which is sure to increase over the coming weeks.
Hizbullah's actions received enormous support in Palestine. Palestinians
everywhere tuned into Hizbullah satellite TV to watch Hizbullah leader
Hassan Nasrallah calmly explain that Israel must release all political
prisoners. A few days later, Israel was further embarrassed after a high
ranking Israeli spy was also captured by Hizbullah.
Arafat's role
A shaky agreement seems to have been arrived at between Barak and Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat, under the watchful eye of US President Bill Clinton.
However, on Palestine's streets there is strong opposition to continuing
negotiations and a willingness to continue the new intifada. Meanwhile,
Israeli massacres continue.
To understand the current situation requires understanding the present
position of Arafat and the role of Fatah.
The relationship of the mass movement to the Palestinian Authority was
ambivalent from the beginning. Although the PA certainly encouraged the
demonstrations, particularly through state-owned media, there was a definite
confusion apparent in the demands and aims of the demonstrations.
Because the dynamic of the movement was explicitly against the Oslo
process and subsequent negotiations, the PA found itself forced to reject
any attempt by the US and Israel to “return to the negotiation table”.
This was apparent in the first unsuccessful attempt to halt the demonstrations
through a meeting between US secretary of state Madeline Albright, Barak
and Arafat on October 10 in Paris.
Many of the larger demonstrations were notable for their lack of portraits
of Arafat, which are usually standard fare in this part of the world.
Grassroots members of Fatah were playing a leading role in the demonstrations
and were also disapproving of the negotiations process. Many Fatah militants
were killed during the demonstrations and Fatah issued several leaflets
condemning attempts to abort the uprising in favour of returning to the
negotiations process.
The issue of armed resistance to the Israeli attacks is probably the
best example of the complex relationship between Fatah and the PA. The
“Tanzim”, or armed Fatah groups, hold a strong position in Palestinian
politics. It was the Tanzim which engaged Israeli settlers and soldiers
in all-night gun battles at the outskirts of most Palestinian cities.
In general, Arafat permits these groups to organise and hold weapons,
while disarming all other political factions. Although the Islamic factions,
such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and to a lesser extent the left factions
probably possess a limited cache of weapons, it is impossible for them
to openly display arms; they would be immediately arrested. The Tanzim,
in contrast, drive the streets with their weapons on display.
In general, Arafat retains almost complete control over the direction
of the mass movement and of Fatah. More than 150,000 (or 20%) Palestinian
employees rely on the PA for salaries. Arafat maintains complete control
over this budget and he, in turn, is reliant upon foreign aid to pay for
it.
Arafat also maintains control over the different security forces and
armed groups within the area. It is extremely difficult for any political
action to occur independently of Arafat at this point.
On the other hand, the events of the last few weeks moved beyond the
control of Arafat and Fatah as a whole. They took on a mass dynamic which
was opposed to the Oslo process and the apartheid on the ground.
Political alternative
They did not, however, begin to challenge the political control of Arafat
and the PA. Herein lies the biggest obstacle to the emergence of an alternative
to Oslo.
There is not yet a political alternative capable of challenging Arafat's
hegemony. The left remains weak, and has not made significant political
gains over the last few weeks.
It is difficult to predict what the coming weeks will hold, although
a likely scenario is a slow demobilisation of the movement as Arafat reigns
in Fatah and the support of the PA. Nevertheless, the events clearly indicate
that any imposed solution along the lines discussed at Camp David will
not be accepted by the Palestinian people.
BY AHMAD NIMER
