By Nick Johnson

PHNOM PENH -- This year's dry-season offensive has ended disastrously for the government. Aiming to take key Khmer Rouge positions in the far north and west, the four month campaign by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces has ended in retreat and disarray.

The government was forced to hurriedly regroup its forces to make an eleventh hour defence of the city of Battambang as the Khmer Rouge repelled the government's troops from its stronghold at Pailin. Foreign organisations evacuated the city as KR troops come within 10 kilometres and the RCAF moved heavy armaments into the centre of town to shell KR positions.

The resumption of civil war only one year after last May's UN-sponsored elections also reveals the fundamental weaknesses of the 1992-93 UNTAC electoral process -- a product of Cambodia's “peace accords”. The performance of UNTAC's Western backers in the recent events -- especially their refusal to give military support to the government which emerged from the elections -- is testimony to the real (and limited) aim of the UNTAC episode: to remove the former Cambodian People's Party government from power.

The two sides in the civil war are now back in the positions they in December, though the Khmer Rouge has gained a little territory and influence as a result.

Poorly equipped and commanded, the bloated RCAF proved to be an ineffective fighting force. Now with the onset of rains, fields will again be impassable and removing KR from its strongholds impossible until the next dry season. In the mid-year wet season, now approaching, the KR is poised to consolidate recent gains.

The offensive began last December when the government moved against the KR's northern headquarters at Anlong Veng. The government claimed it had taken the strategic post but within days had to backtrack. As the KR moved to retake Anlong Veng, ill-equipped government soldiers were sent scurrying across mine fields, sustaining huge casualties in the process.

When government forces moved on the KR central command at Pailin in April, the town had been deserted by the KR. Some observers say that the government troops were angered when officers who had arrived at the town first stripped it of all valuables, leaving the foot soldiers with nothing. As a result many government troops refused to go on fighting.

There are 130,000 on the army's payroll, but many of these are believed to be phantom troops that draw salaries for the bloated officer corps. Cambodians say that generals in this country are as numerous as the stars in the sky. A staggering 68% of the armed forces are in the officer corps, though few are even seen close to military action. When fighting begins, says Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, it is difficult to find any soldiers.

Anlong Veng and Pailin are the key centres for the KR's lucrative trade in timber and gems, from which it has banked a reported $200-300 million. While the KR would find it impossible to secure a political base inside Cambodia, this financial leverage guarantees an increase in its penetration of the countryside in the face of an inept and impoverished government

There can be little doubt that Thai generals, who are the greatest beneficiaries of the KR's timber and gem trade, are surreptitiously supporting the KR campaign, but the government has so far produced no hard evidence of Thai involvement in the recent fighting. Though claims were made that the government had captured “foreign” troops wearing black uniforms -- the colour both of the KR soldiers and the Thai Rangers -- no prisoners were produced.

In the wake of this debacle there has been renewed talk of negotiations between the government and the KR. The main proponent of negotiations is, as ever, King Norodom Sihanouk. Without any reliable forces of his own, Sihanouk has for 25 years used the KR as a cat's paw against allies and enemies alike. He is now at least partially under its influence. Ambitious to return fully to power before he dies -- he is in failing health -- Sihanouk derives an advantage from the crisis within the government. As long as neither the government nor the KR can get the upper hand, it will be necessary to call on the king as the only figure who can resolve the impasse.

But even without the king's activities, the government would be in deep trouble. Factionalised and corrupt, it is virtually paralysed. The National Assembly that resulted from the UNTAC election met only once this year and did not conduct any business. The common aim of most FUNCINPEC and CPP functionaries (with a few notable exceptions) is to put, or keep, their noses in the trough.

FUNCINPEC is divided between finance minister Rainsey and foreign affairs minister Sirivuddh on the one side and Prime Minister Ranariddh on the other. The king has taken sides against his son. The CPP is also deeply factionalised, with two major groupings around party chief Chea Sim and Second Prime minister Hun Sen. Ranariddh and Hun Sen are said to work closely together.

For most political leaders, it's as if the UNTAC elections never took place: the only tangible result was to rearrange somewhat the brutal factional battles that are the hallmark of Cambodian politics.

The first step towards resolving this crisis is the removal of the KR as a military and political force. In the wake of the elections, that need could have been addressed by a united government supported by the international community. But foreign governments (including Australia) refused to come to the party. In doing so, they have again condemned the Cambodian people to violence and destruction.

This article was posted on the Green Left Weekly Home Page.
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